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ABSTRACT 
 
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), as initially authorized by 
the Food Security Act of 1985, operated by removing land from agricultural 
production in order to generate environmental benefits, primarily erosion 
reduction.  Policy, however, often generates unintended consequences.  One 
potential unintended consequence in the CRP is slippage; if the upward 
pressure that the idling of cropland exerts on commodity prices results in the 
activation of new land, behavior that may partly offset the program’s 
environmental benefits, then price-feedback slippage is said to have occurred.  
Examination of county-level wheat production data for the United States 
during the years 1980 to 1993 utilizes a two-stage least squares model in which 
the effect of land retirement under the program on the price of wheat is 
examined, and the correlation between wheat price and acres planted in wheat 
is in turn estimated.  The model indicates a slippage rate for wheat ranging 
between 8.13 and 22.6 percent.   
 If the intended output of the policy was primarily its stated end of soil 
conservation, then the indicated slippage effect is highly relevant to efficacy.  
However, if the true intention of the policy was to provide economic relief to 
 iv 
farmers through the application of program rental payments on retired land, 
then the issue of slippage is irrelevant to the policy’s intendment.  This study 
demonstrates that, based on the historical connection between soil 
conservation and agricultural commodity policies, economic conditions facing 
agriculture in the early 1980s, a number of studies demonstrating a distributive 
rather than regulatory effect of the policy on farm operations, and outspoken 
support for the creation of a program like the CRP on the part of the farm 
lobby at Congressional hearings during the formulation of the 1985 Farm Bill, 
the substantive intendment of the policy as passed in 1985 was to provide 
income relief to farmers, while its stated conservation goals were largely 
symbolic.   
 
  
DEDICATION 
 
 
 Dedicated to my cousin Bart, my grandparents Anne and Joseph, and 
my aunt Jo Ann, each of whom departed before seeing the completion of this 
endeavor.   
 
vi 
  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 I would like to extend my deep gratitude to everyone who provided me 
with encouragement, support and friendship during the process of writing this 
dissertation, particularly my parents; also my friends Marlon and Jo, Rob and 
Beth, my companions at the Strom Thurmond Institute, and especially my 
fellow sojourners, Leslie, who always has exactly the encouraging word that I 
need, and Chip, who inspired me with more good ideas than he probably 
realizes.  Additionally, I thank my committee – Molly Espey, Jahn Hakes and 
Bruce Ransom – for their patience and guidance, and particularly Bob Becker 
whose counsel has been indispensable.  Thanks to Scott Templeton for his help 
early on in conceptualizing the “slippage” problem.  Thanks to Bill Lasser and 
Joe Stewart and all of my friends and colleagues in Political Sciences 
(especially Angie and Donna) for allowing me the opportunity to teach some 
excellent groups of students.  Furthermore, I wish to acknowledge the 
invaluable contribution of Kathy Skinner, not only for making me aware of 
the Policy Studies program, but for all of the encouragement she has given me 
during my years in the program.  Finally, I acknowledge my reliance on my 
Lord Christ, without whom I could do nothing.   
viii 
 
 
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
Page 
 
TITLE PAGE    .............................................................................................        i 
 
ABSTRACT    ...............................................................................................      iii 
 
DEDICATION    ...........................................................................................       v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS    ..........................................................................   vii 
 
LIST OF TABLES    ...................................................................................... xi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES    ....................................................................................    xiii 
 
CHAPTER 
 
          1.     INTRODUCTION    ...................................................................       1 
 
                      Introduction to the Conservation Reserve Program    .........       4 
                      Study Overview    ..................................................................       9 
 
          2.     METHODOLOGY    ..................................................................     11 
 
                      Discerning the “Purpose in Fact” of the CRP    ....................     13 
                      Testing for Slippage    ............................................................     15 
                      The Relevance of Slippage    ..................................................     17 
 
          3.     POLICY HISTORY    .................................................................     19 
 
                      Early Entrepreneurs    ............................................................     20 
                      Initiation of Soil Conservation Policy    ...............................     22 
                      Second Phase:  Income Support Tied to Conservation    .....     25 
                      Third Phase:  Conservation Comes of Age    ........................     31 
                      Phase Four:  Economic and Environmental Trouble    ........     35 
                      Conclusion    ...........................................................................     38 
 x 
Table of Contents (Continued) 
 
          4.     REVIEW OF LITERATURE – CRP IN CONTEXT    ..............     41 
  
                      Policy Typologies    ................................................................     41 
                      Interests in the Policy Process    ...........................................     47 
                      Public Opinion and Public Policy    .....................................     55 
                      Conclusion    ...........................................................................     59 
 
          5.     DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS AND THE CRP    .........................     61 
  
                      CRP as a Distributive Policy    ..............................................     65 
                      The Role of Public Opinion    ...............................................     80 
                      Responding to a Potential Threat    ......................................     84 
                      Conclusion – Preemptive Policymaking    ........................... 95 
 
          6.     SLIPPAGE DEFINED AND DETECTED    .............................. 101 
 
                      The Model    ........................................................................... 111 
                      Results    .................................................................................. 124 
                      Conclusion    ........................................................................... 133 
 
          7.     CONCLUSIONS    ......................................................................   135 
 
                      Summation    ..........................................................................   135 
                      Addenda    ..............................................................................   139 
 
APPENDIX    ................................................................................................   143 
 
REFERENCES    ........................................................................................... 149 
 
  
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table                                                                                                                  Page 
1. Hearings before House Subcommittee on Conservation, 
                Credit and Rural Development    ................................................ 75 
2. Hearings before Senate Committee on Agriculture, 
                Nutrition and Forestry, Subcommittee on Soil 
     and Water Conservation, Forestry, and 
     Environment    ............................................................................. 77 
3. Hearings before Senate Committee on Agriculture    ....................     78 
4. Summary Statistics    ........................................................................ 123 
5.       Model I Results    ............................................................................. 125 
6. Model II Results    ............................................................................   129 
7. Model III Results    ...........................................................................   131 
A-1.   State CRP Enrollment (Total), Ranked by Number of 
 Contracts, March 1986 – June 1992    .............................................   144 
A-2.  State CRP Enrollment (Total), Ranked by Number of 
 Acres, March 1986 – 1992    ............................................................   146 
 
 
 
 xii 
  
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 
 
1. Real Commodity Prices (U.S. Average)    ....................................... 119 
2. Total Program Enrollment and Amount Planted 
                in Wheat (U.S. Total)    ................................................................ 120 
A-1.  Number of Contracts    ....................................................................   145 
A-2. Total Number of Acres Enrolled    ..................................................   147 
 xiv 
 
  
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 It is a bit self-evident perhaps, but public policy is typically enacted to 
achieve some purpose.  This purpose is, as a rule, stated in the text of the 
legislation itself or stated by supporters or lawmakers during congressional 
hearings or debate – this implies a guarantee that “if the actions we 
recommend are undertaken, good (intended) consequences rather than bad 
(unintended) ones actually will come about” (Wildavsky, 1979/1987, p.35).  
One role of the policy analyst is to evaluate whether the policy has succeeded 
in achieving its stated goals and whether, to the extent it has done so, it has 
done so efficiently – in essence, to evaluate whether this implied warranty has 
been kept, or if unintended consequences have occurred.  This issue is 
important in evaluating the efficacy of the policy in achieving its objectives, 
especially if unintended effects serve to any extent to offset the intended 
effects of the policy.   
 Beyond quantifying unintended effects, the policy analyst may also be 
faced with questions regarding the intended effects – whether the stated 
purpose of the policy and its intendment, the policy’s true goals, the true 
purpose for which the policy was enacted, are indeed one and the same.  
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Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) advised that policy evaluation should seek to 
discover the “actual” and not the “alleged effects”.  They continued, “Whether 
or not goals are realized, there may be outcomes of a program or policy that do 
not relate to the original goals” (p.193).  It may well be that the policy does 
fulfill its stated purpose – be it efficiently or inefficiently, but the policy may 
serve another, unstated purpose, or it may be more effective at achieving goals 
that its creators stated as secondary than its primary goals.  Put more simply, a 
policy may cite one purpose and fulfill another.  That being the case, it seems 
relevant for the analyst to inquire as to whether this outcome is serendipitous 
or if it is what was truly intended by policymakers.  Posner (1971) used the 
term “purpose in fact” to describe this concept: “the reasons, whether or not 
anywhere avowed, that provide a consistent explanation of the actual course 
and consequences” of a policy (p.22, footnote).1  This is an especially pertinent 
question when the outcome provides largesse for interests that have 
historically wielded significant influence over the policymaking process.  This 
concept can be illustrated using a particularly egregious example:  Suppose a 
hypothetical member of Congress sponsors a defense bill which awards a 
substantial contract to a defense firm in which his brother-in-law owns a great 
____________________ 
 
1 In essence, the analysis is analogous to that carried out by jurists in determining legislative 
intent, except that, rather than interpreting meaning of statutory language, this study will seek 
to determine the underlying motivation for passage of the program.    
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deal of stock.  The stated purpose of the policy may be to enhance the nation’s 
military readiness, but the purpose in fact would be to enrich the 
congressman’s relative.     
 The purpose of this study is to investigate the relevance of an 
unintended effect, slippage, as relating to the Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP).  The stated goal of the CRP was to reduce soil erosion due to 
cultivation of erodible lands by way of the retirement of environmentally 
sensitive cropland.  If the reduction in cropland is offset, at least in part, by the 
activation of new land resulting from market effects of retiring land under the 
program, then slippage is said to be present.  To the degree that slippage exists, 
if it exists, it would have significant ramifications on the effectiveness of the 
program.  However, if the CRP was passed for reasons other than soil 
conservation, the issue of slippage potentially becomes much less imperative.  
In the previous example of the hypothetical defense bill, the policy itself may 
indeed fulfill its stated purpose to some degree, but the extent to which it does 
would be at best of secondary importance to the bill’s sponsor.   
If the issue of slippage is not important to the program’s goals, the 
question turns to focus on what the purpose in fact of the CRP was; in other 
words, why was the CRP passed?  This raises the parallel question of why the 
policy goals were framed as they were, if indeed the intendment was other 
than the program’s stated end.  An earlier policy by the same name and 
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bearing the same policy instruments was framed as being primarily aimed at 
boosting farm incomes by reducing commodity surpluses; was there any 
substantive reason for the difference in focus, or was it framed differently for 
reasons more strategic in nature?  This study seeks an answer to these 
questions. 
 The first order of business is to introduce the CRP as it was originally 
authorized in 1985 and how it has been modified since.  The focus of the 
remainder of the study, however, will be the CRP as initially authorized.  
 
Introduction to the Conservation Reserve Program 
Congress authorized the Conservation Reserve Program in 1985, 
following a fifty-two year history of federal soil conservation programs.  The 
program was established in Title XII, Subtitle D of the Food Security Act (99-
Stat-1354).  The Act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to accept bids 
from owners and operators of land used in the production of agricultural 
commodities to set aside highly erodible farmland for the purpose of 
preventing soil loss and sedimentation in surface water.  The contracts are 
administered through the Farm Service Agency (FSA), an agency within the 
Department of Agriculture (USDA).  The contracts are in effect from ten to 
fifteen years.  Farmers are not allowed to use the land for harvest or grazing 
purposes during the term of the contract (except when permitted by the 
 5 
Secretary, such as for reason of drought or other emergency), and they are 
required to plant cover crops, most commonly grasses or trees, on enrolled 
land.  In return, the farmers are paid an annual rental fee, and the FSA bears 
up to 50 percent of the cost of establishing the cover required under the 
contract.  Payments may be made either monetarily or through in-kind 
commodities, or a combination of the two, which are delivered by way of the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC).   
 Under Section 1231(b), the program was phased in between 1986 and 
1990, with minimum enrollment growing from 5 million acres in the first year 
to 40 million acres in 1990, not to exceed 45 million acres in any of the years.  
Enrollment is limited to a maximum of 25 percent of the cropland in a given 
county unless it is determined that exceeding this limit would not impose 
economic hardship on that county.   
 Section 1235(a)(1) provides that the Secretary shall refuse to enter into 
a contract on land that has changed ownership within three years prior to the 
beginning of the contract, unless “the land was acquired under circumstances 
that give adequate assurance that such land was not acquired for the purpose 
of placing it in the program”.  This is intended to prevent the creation of a 
market for land with the intent of trading the expected future stream of CRP 
payments as a commodity.   
 6 
 The CRP was reauthorized and amended in Title XIV, Subtitle C of the 
Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 (104-Stat-3359) to 
include wetland and wildlife habitat restoration in addition to soil 
conservation.  Section 1433(c) requires that a minimum of one-eighth of 
enrolled land between 1991 and 1995 be set aside for trees or other vegetation, 
or water to provide wildlife habitat.   
 The only changes to the program in the 1996 reauthorization (110-Stat-
888) were a reduction in the maximum enrollment to 36.4 million acres (Title 
III, Subtitle D, Section 332(b)), and a provision allowing early termination of 
the CRP contract by participants who enrolled before January 1, 1995, and 
who have been enrolled in the program for at least five years (Section 332(c)).   
 The CRP was reauthorized through 2007 under Title II, Subtitle B, 
Section 2101 of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (116-Stat-
134).  This reauthorization also enacted only minor changes to the CRP as 
previously amended.  One change the reauthorization allowed was the 
location of wind turbines on reserved land, the placement and number of 
which was to be determined by the Secretary.  The maximum enrollment was 
also increased to 39.2 million acres.  The legislation disallows landowners who 
are under contract with the CRP from bringing erodible land that has not been 
previously used for cropping into production.  It also restricts CRP enrollment 
to land that has been cropped three of the last six years prior to the contract 
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period; this provision prevents the extension of the program to potential, in 
addition to current, agricultural land, which would consume excessive 
amounts of program funds. 
After 1993, the CRP accounted for the greatest amount of acreage 
reserved under conservation programs and received the greatest share of CCC 
funding (Leathers & Harrington, 2000; U.S. Senate, 2001).  At the end of fiscal 
year 2005, CRP enrollment was 34.9 million acres and total rental payments 
were $1.69 billion, averaging $48.43 per acre (Farm Service Agency [FSA], 
2005).2 
 A landowner who wishes to enroll land in the CRP must submit a bid 
to the CCC for the amount of rent for which he would be willing to retire the 
parcel of land in question; this bid must be at or below the maximum payment 
rate set by the CCC.  This maximum payment rate is set by the CCC on a 
county-by-county basis and is determined relative to average rental rates and 
soil productivity.  Farmers who wish to increase their chances of being 
accepted into the program are encouraged to bid below this maximum 
payment rate (FSA, 1997). 
____________________ 
 
2 Average per acre payment includes yearly allowances for maintenance and program 
incentives.  Average rental payment for land enrolled under the basic program is $43.58 per 
year.  Additional payment for participation in continuous enrollment programs and wetland 
conservation raise the average to as much as $120 per year.  These programs account for only 
ten percent of total program enrollment (FSA, 2005, p.i). 
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Upon receiving the bid, the CCC enlists the services of the National 
Resources Conservation Service to evaluate the environmental value of the 
land vis-à-vis the proposed rental rate.  Land eligibility is determined through 
a targeting process based upon the Environmental Benefits Index (EBI), which 
considers, among other things, the erodibility of the land, the proximity to 
bodies of water and the leachability of the soil, as well as effects of these land 
characteristics on the local population (Feather, Hellerstein and Hansen, 1999).   
Once eligibility has been established, the NRCS reports back to the 
CCC, which enters into contract with the landowner and begins issuing 
payment.  Administration of the program, vis-à-vis monitoring, education, and 
so forth, is carried out through local agencies, including local conservation 
districts, departments of natural resources, forestry agencies, and land grant 
colleges.   
If a landowner or operator violates the terms of the contract, by way of 
disturbing the reserved land by tilling or harvesting without the permission of 
the FSA or in a manner not in keeping with established conservation practices, 
the farmer may face diminution of the rental rate he receives, cancellation of 
the contract, or he may be required to reimburse the CCC for rental payments 
received.   
 In September 1996, the CCC began a Continuous Sign-Up program that 
allows for automatic acceptance of bids that meet the EBI-based requirements 
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and where the land is eligible for certain high-priority conservation practices, 
such as riparian buffers (FSA, 1997).  Continuous Sign-Up occurs in addition 
to, not as a replacement for, the program’s standard periodic sign-ups. 
 
Study Overview 
 
 In the following chapters, the relevance of slippage to program goals is 
assessed by defining the purpose in fact of the program.  This is done first in 
terms of establishing the long-running relationship between soil conservation 
and agricultural policy.  Past agricultural policies were primarily aimed at 
boosting farm incomes through surplus reduction or direct subsidy.  It will 
then be shown that, while the CRP was framed as being primarily targeted to 
soil conservation, the evidence does not indicate that its actual purpose was 
any different than that of similar policies of the past.  This is demonstrated by 
examining the rhetoric surrounding the formulation of the CRP during 
Congressional committee hearings, primarily from the agricultural lobby.  
Further, it is demonstrated that the benefits generated by the program were 
primarily for farmers, while any benefits from soil conservation are far more 
diffuse, thus making the policy one that is clientele and distributive (see Lowi, 
1964 and Wilson, 1973) and not one that can accurately be considered 
regulatory.   
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As is discussed in later chapters, McConnell (1953; 1966) examined the 
historical dominance of farm interests in the agricultural policymaking 
process, and Browne (1988) addressed collusion between farm and 
environmental interest groups in the formulation of the Act that among other 
things created the CRP.  No studies, however, have been done to determine 
whether the stated end of the CRP was indeed its intendment or to determine 
the possible reasons behind this framing of a policy in a manner that obscures 
its actual intent.   
  
CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 In previous studies, Wu (2000; 2005) and Roberts and Bucholtz (2002; 
2005) addressed the question of whether slippage exists in the Conservation 
Reserve Program.  These previous studies tested for slippage resulting from 
substitution effects; however, Wu and Roberts and Bucholtz arrived at 
conflicting conclusions regarding the existence of this phenomenon.  This 
current study seeks to approach the question of the presence of slippage in the 
CRP from a different angle by testing for the presence of slippage resulting 
from price feedback effects; no previous studies have been done to detect 
price-feedback slippage.   
 Wu and Roberts and Bucholtz, however, operated under the premise 
that the presence or absence of slippage is indeed relevant to the program’s 
goals.  While the stated goal of the CRP is the conservation of natural 
resources through the reduction of soil erosion (see for example Chapman, 
1988), a number of factors raise the question of whether this is indeed the true 
purpose, or “purpose in fact”, for the passage of the CRP.  These factors are 
described in this chapter and are examined in detail in the following chapters.  
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While the presence of slippage is the starting point of this discussion, 
the question of the true purpose behind the CRP rises to the fore.  If the 
intendment of the CRP was not soil conservation, then slippage may be 
irrelevant to the true policy goals.  Therefore, this question of purpose in fact 
is addressed first in order to set the context for the determination of whether 
slippage is present.  In this context, the presence of slippage would add to the 
argument that the stated goals of soil conservation are of at best secondary 
import to policy makers, for if the goal of the CRP is in actuality to provide 
income support for farmers, the presence of effects that offset environmental 
gains from land retirement would reinforce a view that the stated conservation 
goals of the program are more symbolic than substantive.  The absence of 
slippage on the other hand, would tend to indicate that the policy is efficacious 
in meeting its stated goals; while not discounting the arguments regarding the 
program’s purpose in fact, it would greatly weaken the case. 
The central question addressed by this research is therefore whether 
slippage is present in the CRP and whether that slippage is relevant to the true 
purpose of the policy.  No previous studies have addressed the question of 
slippage in this holistic manner.  Doing so requires an interdisciplinary 
approach involving an historical perspective of soil conservation policy and 
the application of policy theory, as well as quantitative testing.  The process by 
which this study is undertaken is outlined in the following.   
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Discerning the “Purpose in Fact” of the CRP 
 
The first part of this research endeavor is to examine the evidence for 
the true purpose for which the CRP was enacted.  Doing this involves a three-
pronged approach by which the foundation is laid for the discussion of 
slippage and its relevance to this true purpose.  Clearly, underlying motives are 
often not directly observable, but through the examination of evidence, they 
can be ascertained.  The following points give cause for which the purpose in 
fact of the CRP should be questioned, and they provide the means by which it 
can be discovered.  The three “prongs” of this argument are the historical 
context of the program, the policy environment in which the program was 
formulated and adopted, and the question of who most directly benefits from 
the program. 
The historical background of the CRP is first examined.  This 
examination begins with the genesis of the modern conservation movement 
with the early entrepreneurs around the turn of the twentieth century, but 
mostly involves the development over time of agricultural commodity 
programs and their close relationship with soil conservation policy beginning 
in the years of the Dust Bowl, the Great Depression, and Franklin Roosevelt’s 
“New Deal”.  One policy in particular, the Soil Bank Act of 1956, proves to be 
especially relevant.  This history demonstrates that past policies have not only 
 14 
been tooled to primarily benefit farmers, but that this goal was the stated 
purpose of many of these programs. 
The policy environment is then discussed in detail.  In the context of 
the historical analysis, the marked similarities within the agricultural sector 
between the time of the New Deal and the early 1980s when the CRP was 
enacted are telling.  This discussion also points out three major threats that the 
historically powerful farm lobby faced at the time: an administration favorable 
to reducing federal program spending, a swell in public sentiment in favor of 
conservation, and the related growing influence of the environmental lobby in 
Washington.   
Finally, the CRP is examined for who it primarily benefits.  This 
involves the categorization of the policy in terms of the policy typology 
literature.  The argument is proffered that the CRP is distributive (Lowi, 1964) 
or clientele (Wilson, 1973) rather than regulatory.  This is supported by 
testimony given during Congressional hearings and statements made regarding 
the CRP during debate of the 1985 Farm Bill.   
In conclusion, a theory is formulated in order to explain the reason for 
the framing of the CRP as primarily a conservation policy while its purpose is 
in actuality to supplement farm incomes during a financially troubled time.  
With this foundation laid, the discussion moves to the presence of slippage.  
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Testing for Slippage 
 
 The question of slippage in the CRP has been addressed by a number of 
studies (Grant, 1979; Gardner, 1987b; Love & Foster, 1990; Hrubovcak, 
LeBlanc & Miranowski, 1990; Hoag, Babcock and Foster, 1993).  Most 
prominently, the issue of slippage – resulting from substitution effects – has 
been debated between Wu (2000; 2005) and USDA Economic Research Service 
(ERS) economists Roberts and Bucholtz (2002; 2005).  This current study 
utilizes data on cropping and CRP enrollment during the same period covered 
by Wu and Roberts and Bucholtz, the first twelve signups for the program.  
This specific time period is tested for slippage resulting from price feedback 
effects in order to facilitate direct comparisons with the previous studies and 
to comment on the relevance – or lack thereof – of any slippage found in both 
the previous and this current work.   
One difference in the scope of this study is that, while Wu and Roberts 
and Bucholtz limited their inquiries geographically to a specific region of the 
United States, this research uses cropping data from all 2,681 counties within 
the contiguous United States in which the study commodity, wheat, was 
grown during any year of the study period – wheat is used in order to isolate 
the effects within the market for a single commodity; wheat is also widely 
grown and requires relatively little special land preparation.  Furthermore, 
national enrollment in the CRP is used, as price feedback effects are a market-
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wide phenomenon, and not farm-specific as is that tested for by Wu and 
Roberts and Bucholtz.  Narrower models are also run dropping the lowest ten 
and lowest ninety percent of counties in terms of wheat production to test the 
model’s robustness.   
This research also differs from Wu and Roberts and Bucholtz in that it 
employs an interrupted time series design, which includes six years prior to 
the 1986 implementation of the CRP in order to control for any secular trends 
that might exist in the data which might have predated the program (see Cook 
& Campbell, 1979).  The model therefore examines wheat cropping and prices 
during the years 1980 through 1993, resulting in a total of 37,534 data points.   
 Price feedback refers to a general equilibrium condition in which a 
commodity price increase stimulates an increase in production in turn 
offsetting either partly or wholly the initial price change.  In this instance, the 
decrease in supply resulting from the retirement of CRP land results in an 
increase in commodity price which leads farmers to increase production of the 
commodity, which may lead to the activation of new land.  This new land 
activation is referred to as slippage. 
The model utilizes a two-stage least squares regression in order to 
directly measure price feedback effects then measure its effect on the total 
number of acres planted.  The model estimates are used to calculate the rate of 
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slippage – defined as the number of acres activated as a result of price feedback 
effects – as a percentage of the number of acres retired under the CRP. 
 
The Relevance of Slippage 
 In the following pages, the relevance of the findings of the slippage 
model is evaluated in light of analysis of the purpose behind the passage of the 
CRP.  As described previously, the issue has been the subject of debate with 
ERS as one of the parties.  However, all of these studies have operated under 
the premise that the question of slippage was relevant to the policy’s stated 
purpose of reducing soil erosion; none of them have raised the question of 
whether the program’s purpose in fact was indeed the same as its stated 
purpose, and therefore whether the effect was relevant thereunto.  Both of 
these questions are addressed in this study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
POLICY HISTORY 
 
In exploring the motivations behind passage of the CRP in the 1985 
Farm Bill, it would be efficacious to provide a historical background of the 
relationship between soil conservation policy and agricultural commodity 
programs.  The passage of the CRP did not occur in a vacuum; there existed a 
long history of agricultural policies that employed similar policy instruments.  
In addition to achieving soil conservation goals, many were also directed at 
supplementing farm incomes.   
 The conservation movement in the United States can be traced back to 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with the setting aside of the 
first national reserve lands by President Benjamin Harrison (Proclamation 
No.17, 26-Stat-1565) in 1891 pursuant to a provision in the Forest Reserve Act 
(26-Stat-1095).  This forest conservation movement largely came in response 
to increasing concern over the depletion of forestland during this time (Van 
Hise, 1910, pp.3-4).  Although the focus was on forest conservation during 
much of the early movement, several early entrepreneurs recognized the need 
to expand the focus beyond forestland to water and soil.  These entrepreneurs 
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laid the groundwork for conservation policies to follow, including the broad-
ranging policies of modern times.   
The policies that followed in the years after the entrepreneurs are 
presented as divided into four phases.  The first phase is the initiation of the 
federal role in soil conservation, during which policy was explicitly aimed at 
addressing the problems of soil conservation.  During the second phase, soil 
conservation policy became auxiliary to farm income support.  The third phase 
is marked by the maturing of conservationism as a national issue during the 
environmentally-conscious 1970s, although it is argued that soil conservation 
remained secondary to income support, the political environment necessitated 
that conservation be prominent on policy-makers’ agendas.  The final phase is 
the response to the economic and environmental backlash of stimulative 
agricultural policy that came in response to strong domestic and international 
demand during the 1970s. 
 
Early Entrepreneurs 
 George Perkins Marsh was the first of the great conservationists in the 
American movement.  Marsh saw Man as disruptive of nature and advocated 
conservation as a philosophical imperative.  Marsh is widely seen as the 
forerunner of the ecological school of conservation thought (Rose, 1971).  John 
Muir later followed Marsh’s ecological philosophy of preservation for aesthetic 
 21 
and moral reasons.  Muir worked as an activist for ecological preservation, 
including the founding of the Sierra Club, and continues to serve as the patron 
saint of aesthetic environmentalists to the present day (Rose, 1971).   
 Nathaniel Southgate Shaler played a significant role in gaining 
acceptance of the need for a national conservation policy (Livingstone, 1980).  
Shaler was a true renaissance man in his approach to conservation.  Heavily 
influenced by Louis Agassiz, a Swiss naturalist, and merging the aesthetic (a la 
Marsh) and utilitarian approach, Shaler recognized the importance of 
conserving natural resources in a much more holistic manner than many of his 
contemporaries.  While most conservation policies as late as 1939 focused on 
forest conservation (Van Hise, 1910; Randall, 1939), Shaler wrote on the 
importance of soil conservation, recognizing the role of tillage in contributing 
to topsoil erosion; this was almost prescient of the ravages that the Dust Bowl 
would bring some forty years afterward (Shaler, 1896).  Shaler further stressed 
the importance of education in furthering conservation, and he expressed great 
confidence in the progress of technology to reduce the demands on the 
environment of the growing human population.   
 Gifford Pinchot, a contemporary of Shaler, arose as perhaps the most 
influential policy entrepreneur in the early conservation movement.  
McConnell (1966) stated that Pinchot “stamped conservation upon the 
American consciousness” (p.44).  Like Shaler, Pinchot’s conservationist 
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philosophy partly traced to European influence, having been shaped by his 
study of forestry in France (Forest History Society, 2005).  Also like Shaler, 
Pinchot advocated expansion of environmental protection beyond forestry; as 
the first head of the Forest Service (1905-1910), a member of President 
Theodore Roosevelt’s Inland Waterways Commission in 1907 and chairman of 
the National Conservation Commission in 1908, he advocated the 
interconnectivity of the conservation of forest, water, and soil resources (Van 
Hise, 1910).  A leader in the utilitarian school of conservation, Pinchot 
differed from Marsh and Muir’s ecological approach in that he advocated “wise 
use”, or use with careful management of natural resources, rather than 
preservation of nature for its own sake; for this reason, he opposed in principle 
the formation of forest reserves.  Pinchot and Muir began as allies, but the 
disagreement between the ecological and utilitarian schools prompted their 
disassociation.  It was Pinchot who, in 1907, coined the term “conservation” to 
describe the movement (Rose, 1971).  Along with Shaler, Pinchot helped to 
establish the forestry program at Harvard University in 1904 (Livingstone, 
1980).   
 
Initiation of Soil Conservation Policy 
 A 1928 USDA circular entitled “Soil Erosion: A National Menace”, 
reprinted in Smith (1971), was authored by Hugh H. Bennett and W.R. 
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Chapline, researchers with the Bureau of Chemistry and Soils and the Forest 
Service respectively.  The circular brought the problem of soil erosion from 
water runoff to the public attention, and is credited as being instrumental in 
the formation of the Soil Conservation Service in 1935.  Bennett and Chapline 
proposed the following measures to mitigate the problem: planting of cover 
vegetation, regulation of grazing on erodible lands, protection of plant cover 
from damage by fire, and landscape engineering for the control of erosion 
(pp.401-413).  These measures are echoed in modern conservation policies, 
including the CRP. 
 Subsequent to the Bennett and Chapline circular, Congressman James 
P. Buchanan (TX) added an amendment to the 1929 USDA appropriation bill 
allowing the Secretary of Agriculture “to make investigation not otherwise 
provided for, of the causes of soil erosion… and to devise means to be 
employed in the preservation of the soil, the prevention or control of 
destructive erosion and the conservation of rainfall by terracing or other 
means” (Smith, 1971, p.414; 45-Stat-1207).   
 Starting in 1931, a lack of rain combined with over-cultivated land in 
the American Midwest resulted in the agricultural crisis known as the “Dust 
Bowl”.  During this period, which extended to 1935, a great deal of top soil was 
lost to wind erosion; one particularly severe dust storm in 1934 spread dust as 
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far as the Eastern Seaboard.  Bennett cited this as garnering public attention to 
the problem of soil erosion (Laycock, 1988).   
 In 1933, Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes formed the Soil 
Erosion Service (SES) within the Department of the Interior; Bennett was 
made director (Helms, 1998).  In that same year, Ickes designated $5 million to 
the SES to oversee and provide technical assistance to Midwestern farmers for 
carrying out emergency conservation measures, including terracing, contour 
plowing and listing – a plowing method that allowed for additional moisture 
retention (Hurt, 1981).   
Congress subsequently created the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) 
within the USDA in 1935, and Bennett was placed in charge of the new 
agency.  The Act, dubbed the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act 
(or Soil Conservation Act), enabled the newly-created Service to conduct 
research into soil erosion and appropriate preventive measures, to execute 
such preventive measures as outlined in the 1928 circular, to offer financial 
assistance to landowners or other entities for the prevention of soil erosion, 
and to take control of lands for the purposes of the Act, “by purchase, gift, 
condemnation, or otherwise, whenever necessary” (49-Stat-163).  The Soil 
Conservation Service was the predecessor to the modern Natural Resources 
Conservation Service (NRCS) (Helms, 1998).  The SCS took the lead in 
overseeing the emergency measures in the Midwest, which Hurt credited with 
 25 
bringing the loss of topsoil under control.  According to Hurt, farmers 
undertaking SCS conservation measures saw an increase in land value and in 
farm income.  In addition, 95 percent said that they planned to maintain 
conservation measures after their SCS contracts had lapsed (p.86). 
Also in 1935, Congress passed Title III of the Bankhead-Jones Farm 
Tenant Act, which allowed the USDA to purchase submarginal land “to 
correct maladjustments in land use, and thus assist in controlling soil erosion, 
reforestation, preserving natural resources… and protecting the public lands” 
(50-Stat-525).  The scope of the mission of the Bankhead-Jones Act would later 
be expanded to the protection of fish and wildlife in the 1962 Food and 
Agriculture Act (87-Stat-607).   
 
Second Phase:  Income Support Tied to Conservation 
 The initial soil conservation policies, while based upon the work of the 
early entrepreneurs, occurred in response to specific focusing events (see 
Kingdon, 1995) and were clearly focused upon soil conservation as their 
central purpose.  However, the arrival of the Great Depression and the Dust 
Bowl created a policy environment ripe for an overall paradigm shift in the 
role of government in the national economy, which included a number of 
agricultural policies aimed at providing income enhancement to struggling 
farmers.   
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The farm aid portion Franklin Roosevelt’s “New Deal” centered on the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) (48-Stat-31), passed in 1933.3  The 
primary intention of this act was to support farm incomes by restricting supply 
of agricultural commodities in order to drive up market prices.  The AAA 
offered landowners the option of idling land in exchange for payment, a 
mechanism that foreshadowed the modern CRP.  The AAA utilized the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) – created by executive order in that 
same year – to deliver payment to participating farmers.  Funds for providing 
these payments were generated through taxation of the commodities regulated 
by this act.  The AAA passed with strong support from the American Farm 
Bureau Federation; the agricultural interest claimed credit for formulation of 
the program, but this claim was debatable (see McConnell, 1953). 
The AAA encountered some constitutional difficulty when the 
Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), that the Act 
misapplied the use of the power of taxation granted Congress in Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution for purposes of providing for the “General 
Welfare of the United States”, in that legislation that was aimed at benefiting 
____________________ 
 
3 The “New Deal” was largely the product of a core group of Roosevelt advisors: Raymond 
Moley, Rexford Tugwell, and Adolf Berle, Jr., all of whom were Columbia University 
professors.  Moley was Roosevelt’s speechwriter who coined the term “new deal”, Tugwell was 
the agricultural expert of the group, while Berle was described as an expert on credit matters 
(Davis, 1994, pp.254, 268, 292). 
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agriculture did not constitute a “general” (national) interest, and on the 
grounds that the federal regulation of agricultural production encroached on 
the reserved powers of the states guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment.  
Congress subsequently amended the AAA in 1938 (52-Stat-31) to make soil 
conservation the primary goal of the Act, stating in Title I, Section 101 that 
the Secretary shall “encourage and provide for soil-conserving and soil-
rebuilding practices”, in order to appease the “general welfare” portion of the 
argument, and to allow state and local administration of the easement 
program, a means of dealing with the Tenth Amendment issue (Lockart, 
Kamisar, Choper & Shiffrin, 1986).  Clearly, in modern times, with the 
reevaluation of reserved powers vis-à-vis the powers of Congress under the 
Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment issue is seen as much less of a 
constitutional problem, as modern agricultural programs such as the CRP 
routinely engage the local farmer directly with the Department of Agriculture.  
The 1938 Act remains in effect (7 U.S.C., Chapter 35) except when superseded 
by newer legislation.   
The AAA of 1938 set the precedent for the tying of soil conservation to 
farm income support programs.  In essence, Congress used soil conservation, 
an issue made viable by the afore-mentioned Dust Bowl crisis, to legitimize a 
program whose originally-stated intention was to benefit the agricultural 
industry.  The continued practice of linking income support and soil 
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conservation in subsequent legislation would seem to lend credibility to the 
statement made by the interest group American Farmland Trust (AFT) decades 
later that “conservation was definitely a by-product of production controls, 
rather than a central aim” (AFT, 1984, p.56). 
Following the Second World War, a second wave of natural resource 
conservation measures began, starting with the creation of the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) in 1946 (60-Stat-1100), which was slated to manage 
public lands.  During this time, private conservationist organizations became 
increasingly involved in the movement, including the Conservation 
Foundation in 1948, followers of the ecological school, and Resources for the 
Future in 1952, an organization the uses economic theory to make 
conservation policy recommendations (RFF, 2006).  In 1948, some forestry and 
other technical societies joined forces with a number of lay groups to form the 
Natural Resources Council of America, which advocates “the sustainable 
management of the world's natural resources” (NRCA, 2006; Rose, 1971; 
Beatty, 1952).   
  The Agricultural Act of 1954 (68-Stat-897) was the next farm bill to 
contain soil conservation measures.  Title V of the Act amended the 1935 Soil 
Conservation Act to allow for the allocation of funding of soil conservation 
practices and research among the states according to need, with a focus on 
lands converted back to cropping use from acreage allotment programs under 
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the 1938 AAA.  This act was much less interventionist than the AAA and did 
not contain a direct link between conservation and income support. 
 Two years later, however, the Soil Bank program was created by Title I 
of the Agricultural Act of 1956 (70-Stat-188), which constituted the next 
major step in the evolution of the marriage of income enhancement and soil 
conservation programs.  The program directly resulted from campaign 
promises by President Dwight Eisenhower to deal with surplus production of 
agricultural commodities (Congressional Quarterly [CQ], 1956, pp.378-9).  
Citing economic hardship experienced by the nation’s farmers resulting from 
surpluses spawned by wartime production incentives, the president delivered a 
message to Congress on January 9, 1956 encouraging “prompt Congressional 
action” in order to pass a voluntary program in order to reduce production and 
to improve commodity prices.  As a part of his proposed legislation, the 
president advocated the deactivation of lands that “have come into cultivation 
which wise land use and sound conservation would have reserved to forage 
and trees,” stating that “the nation does not need these acres in harvested 
crops” (CQ, 1956, pp.52, 54).  Congress subsequently authorized two programs 
to reduce “excessive” production of commodities and to conserve soil, water 
and wildlife habitat (Section 102).  The Acreage Reserve Program, created by 
Subtitle A, compensated landowners for the setting aside of agricultural lands 
used in the production of a given set of commodities for a set period of time – 
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the years 1956-1959.  The Acreage Reserve Program was discontinued in 1958 
due to high expense and little success at reducing production (ERS, 1984, 
p.22).   
Land enrolled in the Acreage Reserve was in addition to land set aside 
under the second program, the Conservation Reserve Program.  This second 
program, established by Subtitle B of the Soil Bank Act, shares both its name 
and its instruments with the program that is the focus of this dissertation.  
Under this earlier iteration of the Conservation Reserve Program, landowners 
enrolled under contracts that were a minimum of three years and a maximum 
of ten years, or fifteen if trees were planted as cover on the reserved land.  The 
Soil Bank CRP enrolled as much as 28.7 million acres at one point, but any 
environmental benefits generated by the program were lost when most of the 
enrolled lands were plowed within a few years of contract expiration 
(Laycock, 1988, pp.6-7).  The Soil Bank program did not specifically target 
highly erodible land for enrollment (Bedenbaugh, 1988); aside from the sheer 
size of the program and the length of contract agreements, this was the 
primary difference between this program and the CRP as passed in 1985.  
However, the 1985 CRP was billed as a program aimed primarily at soil 
conservation.  This apparent discrepancy will be addressed in a later chapter. 
In 1962, the Soil Conservation Act was amended by Title I of the Food 
and Agriculture Act (76-Stat-606) to allow the USDA to enter into contracts 
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with farmers “providing for changes in cropping systems and land uses and for 
practices or measure to be carried out… on lands… used in the production of 
crops”.  These contracts, which did not necessarily require farmers to stop 
cultivating affected land, paid farmers to use conservation measures on 
cropped land for a period of ten years – fifteen years if the land was planted in 
trees.   
 The Soil Bank, including the CRP, was repealed and superseded by 
Title VI of the Food and Agricultural Act of 1965 (79-Stat-1206), which 
established the Cropland Adjustment Program (CAP).  This program 
authorized the USDA to enter into five to ten-year contracts with farmers to 
maintain “conserving crops” on, or to keep idle, designated land, and to refrain 
from harvesting or grazing the land during the contract period; in this sense, 
CAP was not remarkably different from the CRP.  However, CAP allowed the 
Secretary to increase the amount of the payment to the landowner if the 
landowner allowed the land to be used for activities for the “benefit of the 
general public”, such as hunting, trapping, fishing or hiking.  CAP expired at 
the end of calendar year 1969. 
 
Third Phase:  Conservation Comes of Age 
 Around the beginning of the decade of the 1970s, environmental issues 
became a politically fashionable issue.  Following a number of focusing events, 
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such as the killer fogs in Donora, Pennsylvania in 1948 and London, England 
in 1952 and the fire on the Cuyahoga River in Ohio in 1969, public support for 
environmental regulation began to grow significantly.  According to testimony 
by Thomas Kimball, executive director of the National Wildlife Federation, 
before the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Conservation and 
Natural Resources in 1970, his organization’s polls indicated that eighty 
percent of those polled favored environmental regulation.  Prior to this, a 
group of over eighty members of the House of Representatives declared the 
1970s “the decade of the environment” (CQ, 1970, p.488).  President Richard 
Nixon’s message on the environment, delivered to Congress on February 10, 
1970, called for “fundamental new philosophies of land, air and water use… 
for expanded government action… and for new programs” (CQ, 1970, p.22-A).  
The first Earth Day was held on April 22, 1970; this is widely considered to 
have marked the beginning of the modern environmental movement.  In 
response to this shift in public awareness and opinion, lawmakers passed a new 
wave of environmental regulations much more comprehensive than those of 
previous generations, including Nixon’s Reorganization Plan Number Three in 
1970, which created the Environmental Protection Agency, the Clean Water 
and Clean Air Amendments of 1972, and the Endangered Species Act of 1973. 
 During this period, Title VIII of the Agricultural Act of 1970 (84-Stat-
1379) amended the Soil Conservation Act to allow the use of acreage set asides 
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under the Act for wildlife food plots or habitat as determined by the Secretary 
of Agriculture in consultation with the Secretary of Interior.  The Soil 
Conservation Act was further amended to limit the amount of land set asides 
in any county or community so as to not adversely affect the local economy; 
the quantity of this limitation was to be determined by the Secretary of 
Agriculture, taking into account the productivity of the retired land relative to 
other local agricultural lands.  Additionally, Title X of the Agriculture and 
Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (87-Stat-241) established the Rural 
Environmental Conservation Program by authorizing the USDA to carry out 
the purposes of the Soil Conservation Act by entering into three, five, ten, or 
twenty-five year contracts with landowners giving the agency “such control as 
the Secretary determines to be needed on the farms, ranches, wetlands, forests, 
or other lands covered thereby.”  The legislation further authorized the USDA 
to “purchase perpetual easements to promote… the sound use and 
management of flood plains, shore lands, and aquatic areas” and for other 
purposes, including expanding fish and wildlife habitat and recreational areas.  
Landowners under both of these regimes were responsible for submitting a 
plan for conservation practices to be carried out on the land; acceptable 
practices were to be determined in conjunction with an advisory board in each 
state to be appointed by the Secretary.  The USDA was authorized to provide 
materials including seed, plants or trees to the landowner to assist in carrying 
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out the provisions of the contract.  The USDA was also authorized to 
implement a forestry incentives program that was to be aimed at encouraging 
the planting of trees in open or deforested areas for timber production. 
 Title XV of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 (91-Stat-1019) 
amended the Soil Conservation Act, creating the Agricultural Conservation 
Program, which authorized the Secretary to offer financial assistance to 
landowners for implementing conservation practices where there is “a 
conservation or environmental problem which reduces the productive 
capacity of the Nation’s land and water resources or causes degradation of 
environmental quality.”  The amount of the payment was to be determined by 
the Secretary according to the level of benefit to the environment resulting 
from the practice, the costs imposed on the landowner or operator by the 
practice, whether the practice would be carried out at desirable levels without 
USDA financial assistance and whether the landowner or operator is receiving 
assistance under other environmental programs.  This program was not an 
easement program, which is telling given the high demand experienced by the 
agricultural sector during this period.  Federal policy was primarily stimulative 
in nature, rather than targeted at surplus reduction as it had been during 
earlier decades. 
 35 
Phase Four:  Economic and Environmental Trouble 
According to an ERS study (Heimlich, 1985), between the years 1979 
and 1981, following a decade of high demand for United States agricultural 
products in the world market, a net of 6.9 million acres were converted to 
cropland from other uses – an average rate of 2.3 million acres added to 
production per year.  Heimlich found that newly activated land was somewhat 
more susceptible to water erosion than existing cropland and that fewer 
conservation practices were carried out on the new land.  1.9 million acres of 
newly activated cropland over this three-year period were classified as “highly 
erodible”.  On balance, Heimlich described new cropland as having “slightly 
higher erosion rates than existing cropland” (p.12).  Much of this land was 
located in the Great Plains states – particularly Colorado and the Dakotas 
(Laycock, 1988). Chapman (1988) cited this increase in cultivation of erodible 
land as the “real reason” that the CRP was enacted (p.11).  The ERS described 
the purpose for the CRP as “primarily to reduce soil erosion on highly erodible 
cropland”; “secondary objectives” listed include “protecting the Nation's long 
run capability to produce food and fiber, reducing sedimentation, improving 
water quality, fostering wildlife habitat,” and finally, “curbing the production 
of surplus commodities, and providing income support for farmers” (ERS, 
2002).     
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This income support had become necessary because the boom in 
agriculture of the 1970s had come to an end by the early 1980s.  A wheat 
embargo against the Soviet Union following its invasion of Afghanistan 
substantially diminished international demand for United States commodities 
while a deep recession depressed domestic demand.  In addition to this, a 
bumper crop in 1982 further depressed commodity prices (Bowers, Rasmussen 
& Baker, 1984, p.40).  One farm interest representative described this period of 
time as an agricultural depression (U.S. House, 1984, p.161).  Such is the 
economic environment into which the 1985 Farm Bill was introduced.4  The 
first “Farm Aid”, a massive concert fundraiser intended to benefit cash-
strapped small family farmers, was held on September 22, 1985, just under two 
months to the day before passage of the 1985 Farm Bill.   
 The first relevant piece of legislation passed during this period was Title 
XV, Subtitle A of the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 (95-Stat-1328), 
wherein Congress reaffirmed its commitment to “promote soil and water 
conservation, improve the quality of the Nation’s waters, and preserve and 
protect natural resources through the use of effective conservation and 
____________________ 
 
4 ERS found that the number of farm bankruptcy filings in the 1980s was nearly double that of 
the years leading into the Great Depression.  In 1987, the number of filings peaked at 23.1 per 
10,000 farms compared to 13.7 per 10,000 farms in 1925.  ERS, however, attributed some of 
this number to the implementation of a new bankruptcy law in late 2006 (Stam & Dixon, 
2004, pp.11-13). 
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pollution abatement programs.”  In Subtitle B, Congress reported the findings 
of USDA studies indicating that agriculture-related soil erosion and related 
losses in productivity were serious problems being faced across a wide range of 
geographic areas.  Congress further reported that policies aimed at addressing 
this problem should “address the local social, economic, environmental, and 
other conditions unique to the area involved” and should be “integrated with 
the concerns of the local community.”  The Special Areas Conservation 
Program authorized the USDA to designate geographic areas with “severe and 
chronic” problems with erosion or water management, then entering into 
contracts with landowners and operators within these areas to provide 
technical and financial assistance for the implementation of conservation 
practices aimed at alleviating the specific problem.  As in the case of the 1962 
Soil Conservation Act amendment, this program did not necessarily prohibit 
cultivation of land under contract, unless cover crops were the chosen 
practice, but simply required farmers to utilize the land using the designated 
practices; the USDA assisted the farmer in the costs of implementing the 
chosen conservation practices.   
The Act also authorized the Resource Conservation and Development 
Program (p.1337), by which the USDA provided technical and financial 
assistance to state and local governments and non-profit organizations for the 
development and implementation of programs for the conservation of land and 
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other natural resources.  The Act further established the Farmland Protection 
Policy Act (p.1341), requiring the Federal Government to ensure that its 
programs did not contribute to the loss of farmland to non-farming use.   
 The Food Security Act of 1985 (99-Stat-1354) established the modern 
Conservation Reserve Program, which is the focus of this study.  In addition to 
the CRP, the Act included the "Swampbuster" and "Sodbuster" programs, 
which denied farm subsidy program benefits to farmers who cultivated 
wetland or highly erodible land, respectively.  The Act also put in place 
"Conservation Compliance" measures, which required farmers to implement 
approved conservation measures and to grow only approved crops on highly 
erodible land already cultivated.  As in the case of Conservation Compliance, 
failure to comply meant loss of program benefits.     
 
Conclusion 
 
 Soil conservation and agricultural policy have been intimately tied 
from the very beginning of both policy areas.  This association is of course 
natural, given the centrality of soil as a resource for crop production and the 
role that agriculture has historically had in contributing to soil erosion.  But 
there is an additional facet to this relationship.   
 The 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act was the prototype of the policies 
to come, both commodity and conservation programs; the AAA was a program 
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intended to boost farm income in the face of extreme economic hardship, 
although a goal of soil conservation was added to the 1938 edition in response 
to the Butler opinion.  Federal policy that explicitly targeted soil conservation, 
beginning with the 1935 Soil Conservation Act, originally placed the federal 
government principally in an advisory role, but it is telling that when the 
federal role became more activist with the passage of the Soil Bank in 1956, 
the programs largely were patterned after the AAA.  The connection, 
therefore, between soil conservation and agricultural policy is not merely a 
matter of the importance of soil to farming or of farming to soil erosion.  The 
common thread between the two policy areas is the enhancement of farm 
income.   
This provides the first link in the chain of arguments that the purpose 
for which the CRP was passed was to supplement farmer incomes.  Indeed, 
that many of these past policies, one of which was virtually identical to the 
program that is the current object of study, were passed for the stated purpose 
of farm income enhancement would seem to place the burden of proof, as it 
were, on the claim that the CRP was enacted primarily for conservation 
purposes. 
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CHAPTER 4 
  
REVIEW OF LITERATURE – CRP IN CONTEXT 
 
 
 The first step in examining the purpose for the passage of the 
Conservation Reserve Program is to provide context within the body of 
scholarly literature in which the CRP is to be scrutinized.  First, the literature 
on policy typology is considered.  Next, the role of interest groups and 
subgovernments in the policy process is discussed, including a previous work 
examining the passage of the 1985 Farm Bill (Browne, 1988), the legislation 
that authorized the CRP.  Finally, the role of public opinion in determining 
policy formulation and adoption is reviewed.   
 
Policy Typologies 
 Lowi (1964) classified policy into one of three types – distributive, 
redistributive or regulatory.5  Lowi (1964) pointed out that with a long enough 
time horizon, any policy can be defined as either redistributive, because any 
policy ultimately will require use of tax money collected from one group and 
effectively allocated to the beneficiaries of the policy, or regulatory, as any 
____________________ 
 
5 Lowi (1972) later added constituent policy as a fourth type.   
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policy ultimately removes resource allocation decisions from the private to the 
government sector.  However, distributive policy is differentiable from 
redistributive and regulatory because, in the short run, it can be enacted 
“without regard to limited resources” (p.690).  Costs in the long run are 
sufficiently disaggregated to substantially diminish the incentives toward 
opposition.  Ripley and Franklin (1980) described distributive policy as “aimed 
at promoting private activities that are said to be desirable to society as a 
whole… such policies and programs provide subsidies for those private 
activities and thus convey tangible government benefits” (p.21).   
 Regulatory policy has a direct bearing on the behavior of the individual 
by positive inducements, which decrease the cost of the behavior through 
incentives, or negative inducements, which increase costs by way of penalties, 
up to and including outright prohibition.  According to Lowi (1964), 
regulatory policy is distinguishable from distributive because beneficiaries and 
those on whom these costs are to be imposed are both identifiable in the short 
run.  Ripley and Franklin expanded the regulatory type to include 
“competitive regulatory” and “protective regulatory”.  Competitive regulatory 
policies are aimed at restricting competition between multiple providers of a 
good or service, for example, regulation of the cable television industry and 
licensing requirements that many states have for certain industries; these are 
the types of regulatory policies that Stigler (1971) argued would be sought by 
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rent-seeking producers within given industries.  Protective regulatory policies 
are aimed at protecting public welfare through the restriction of certain types 
of behavior; examples of this type of regulation include food and drug 
regulation and environmental policies such as clean water and clean air 
regulations.   
Lowi (1972) placed his four policy types on a two-by-two grid.  He 
differentiated regulatory from distributive policy by the likelihood versus the 
applicability of coercion.  Both policy types apply coercion (attempt to 
influence) to individual behavior, but the application of coercion (direct 
government action) is remote for distributive policy and immediate for 
regulatory.  Spitzer (1987) differentiated between pure and mixed regulation 
on the basis of the immediacy of coercion.  It is mixed regulation, which 
depends upon incentive structures to influence individual behavior instead of 
command-and-control instruments within which Spitzer placed farm subsidies 
(i.e. commodity programs).  He argued that, while resembling distributive 
policy, mixed regulatory policies are regulatory by their character.  However, 
Spitzer’s inclusion of farm subsidies in this category conflicts with Lowi’s 
(1964) use of land policies and “agricultural ‘clientele’ services” as archetypes 
of distributive policy (p.690), and with Ripley and Franklin, who likewise used 
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agricultural price support and soil conservation policies as examples of 
distributive policy.6   
 An alternative typology to Lowi’s was put forth by Wilson (1973; see 
also Wilson & DiIulio, 2004).  This typology is somewhat similar to the matrix 
laid out by Lowi (1972).  Wilson described policy according to the 
concentration of costs and benefits.  Two of his types are relevant to this 
discussion.   
 When a policy imposes costs that are diffused among a large number 
and benefits that are concentrated – i.e. directed at a relatively small number – 
the policy process is labeled client (or clientele) politics – this policy type 
coincides with Lowi’s distributive type.  In such a regime, only beneficiary 
interests have incentive to organize and lobby for favorable policies; those 
providing the funding for the largesse (i.e. the taxpayers) typically have little 
incentive to incur the cost of organizing due to the low marginal costs imposed 
upon them by the policy.7  Wilson classified agricultural commodity programs 
under this type, again agreeing with Lowi’s (1964) typification of agricultural 
policy.  The reverse – concentrated costs and diffuse benefits – is termed 
____________________ 
 
6 Spitzer warned, however, that the distinction between the applicability of coercion to 
individuals versus the policy environment and between the remote versus immediate 
likelihood of coercion should be viewed as a continuum and not as discrete.   
7 Buchanan & Tullock (1965/1999) discussed the scenario of diffused costs and concentrated 
benefits as conducive to the formation of interest groups by beneficiaries. 
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“entrepreneurial politics”.  Wilson classified environmental regulatory polices 
under this type.  For example, clean air and clean water regulation provide 
benefits that are diffused among the entire population of the affected area, but 
the regulation imposes costs on a relatively small number, namely factory 
owners, farmers, or whoever the polluters are in the given situation.  This 
form of politics requires policy entrepreneurs to in effect represent the 
interests of the beneficiaries, since by and large the benefits are diffused 
enough to dispel the incentive to incur the costs of organizing and lobbying 
for the benefits themselves.8   
Baldwin (1971) distinguished between positive and negative 
inducements in that the withholding of reward (positive) in the case of 
noncompliance is not equivalent to punishment (negative), if the reward is 
conditional and the receiving party has a “prior expectation” that he will not 
be rewarded for noncompliance (see p.26) – these conditions are of course met 
in the CRP, given that the conditions for reward are laid out in the contract.9  
Positive and negative “inducements” are sometimes equated in terms of their 
effects on behavior (Stone, 2002, p.272).  Baldwin characterized positive and 
____________________ 
 
8 This is not to say that interest groups are entirely absent in this regime.  Olson (1965) for 
example dealt with the questions surrounding how interest groups are organized and 
mobilized under circumstances of diffuse benefits.  Nonetheless, even in these circumstances, 
entrepreneurial behavior plays a central role. 
9 Baldwin used the term “sanctions” rather than “inducements”. 
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negative inducements as both relevant to the exercise of political power.  
Baldwin does not distinguish between the regulatory and distributive elements 
of positive and negative inducements.  Unlike negative inducements, however, 
positive inducements provide the opportunity for income supplementation by 
those being regulated, while negative inducements only impose penalties for 
non-compliance.     
 Stigler (1971) in describing the demand for regulation generated by 
firms within given industries, differentiated between regulations that impose 
“onerous” effects upon the industry, such as so-called sin taxes levied on 
alcohol and tobacco products, and those that he deemed as “beneficial 
regulation” (p.3).  The latter includes entry restriction, such as licensing which 
has the effect of limiting competition, price floors and subsidies.  Stigler 
defined regulation in general as “the coercive powers of the state” (p.4).  
Clearly, in the case of “beneficial regulation” as in the examples cited by 
Stigler, the coercion is not directed to the firms currently within the industry.  
Perhaps the caveat of “usually” should be added to the previous sentence – 
some coercion is applied to firms within the industry in the case of price floors 
for example, as the threat of penalties are imposed on firms to prevent an 
attempt to undercut their competitors by charging below the minimum price.  
One might imagine however the firm pleading, “Please don’t throw me in that 
briar patch”.   
 47 
Posner (1971) stated that “one of the functions of regulation is to 
perform distributive and allocative chores usually associated with the taxing or 
financial branch of government” (p.23).  Maloney and McCormick (1982) 
concurred, stating that regulation “not only corrects a resource misallocation, 
but it creates a scarcity rent as well” (p.99).  Positive inducements clearly carry 
out this function.  Naturally, they also fit with Stigler’s beneficial regulation 
category; as in the case of price floors, producers are required to behave in a 
certain manner, but this behavior produces outcomes beneficial not onerous to 
the “regulated” firm.  Stigler is correct in describing this type of policy as 
“regulation” insofar as it affects the allocation of resources versus that which 
would occur in an unregulated market.  However, the classification of this 
type of policy as akin to command-and-control regulation is not tenable.  One 
imposes a net cost, eo ipso, on the regulated firm; the other imparts a net 
benefit.  This shall be examined in the next chapter.  First, however, a review 
of the role of interests in the policy process shall be undertaken. 
 
Interests in the Policy Process 
This study would be remiss to discuss interest groups without 
discussing their interaction with other players within the policy process 
(Bentley, 1908/1967).  This interaction is commonly referenced by theorists as 
subgovernments or policy subsystems.  The traditional view of 
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subgovernments is the iron triangle, consisting of interest groups interacting 
with Congressional committees and executive regulatory agencies.  Within 
these subgovernments, interests and bureaucrats exert influence upon 
legislators through personal relationships, persuasion – sometimes by playing 
committee members or even committees themselves against one another, 
other times by exploiting their information advantage over legislators as 
interests are typically specialized in their particular policy area – and 
propaganda, appealing to legislators’ own interests via their constituents.  
Legislators in turn hold the purse strings, giving them influence over executive 
agencies and bargaining power with interests (Freeman, 1965).  Browne (1995) 
however dismissed iron triangles as “hopelessly reductionist” (p.11).  McCool 
(1998) stated that “the iron triangle concept described an extreme set of 
conditions that were so specific and unyielding that very few political 
phenomena matched the description” (p.554).  The iron triangle concept, it 
would seem, lacks the flexibility to explain the complexities of the policy 
process.  Constraining the cast of participants to three “players” disregards a 
number of other factors that enter into the process and influence its outcome.  
Nonetheless, as a very basic framework, the iron triangle has proven to have 
some value; Heclo’s (1978) issue network construct as well as Sabatier’s (1988) 
advocacy coalition framework, both to be discussed in the following 
paragraphs, are fundamentally variations on the iron triangle concept.  At the 
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very least, by identifying the central players and outlining their basic 
relationship to one another, the triad provides a conceptual reference around 
which more complex or more flexible models can be built. 
With the increase in complexity seen within the American political 
system during the twentieth century, Heclo (1978) argued that the traditional 
iron triangle no longer adequately describes the dynamics of policy 
subsystems.  Rather than old policy issues replaced by new ones, new issues 
are simply added onto the old ones, leading to more individuals and groups 
with a stake in the outcome; additionally, policy issues have become much 
more technical.  As a result, besides the standard triad, academics, legal experts 
and even the general public have become increasingly involved in the policy 
process.  Membership in these “issue networks” is more dynamic relative to 
iron triangles, whose membership is much more stable over time.  McCool 
(1998), however, criticized Heclo’s issue network concept as too amorphous to 
identify and too broad to carry any explanatory power, in effect implying the 
old axiom “it explains everything, therefore it explains nothing”.   
Sabatier (1988), however, offered a useful expansion of Heclo.  Sabatier 
described the interaction of “advocacy coalitions” that form around a set of 
beliefs or values concerning policy issues.  These coalitions (i.e. subsystems) 
may alter their strategies or modify their beliefs in response to internal or 
external factors.  Most relevant to the current discussion is change in the 
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external environment, including social and economic factors (to use Sabatier’s 
example, the oil crisis in the 1970s spurred some interests that had previously 
favored automobile emission standards to call for a relaxation of those 
standards), shifts in political power structures (a shift in party control of 
Congress or the White House for example), or the behavior of other coalitions, 
which may require a strategic response or countermove by the first coalition.  
In general, however, Sabatier argued that coalitions will be relatively stable 
over time, at least as concerning the key issues in which the coalition is 
interested.  Policy changes, according to Sabatier, are attributable to these 
movements in the central belief structures of coalitions.   
While policy subsystems involve a number of players, this current 
study is primarily concerned with the behavior of interest groups.  Truman 
(1951/1971) described interests as the unit of study in public policy formation.  
Buchanan and Tullock (1965/1999) described the growth in influence of 
interest groups during the twentieth century as “one of the most significant 
developments in the American political scene” (p.3.19.1).  Buchanan and 
Tullock attributed this growth to the increase in the importance of the 
government relative to the private sector and to the asymmetric impact policy 
has had on subsets of the population.  Truman put forth a similar view of the 
growth in interest group activity, attributing it largely to the organization of 
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latent groups of individuals whose self-interest is threatened in some way by 
the activities of previously-organized interests.   
  Interests interact in one of two ways (Kelso, 1978).  Groups may 
compete in a type of free market for influence through a process very much 
like that described by Madison in Federalist 10; this was ensconced in 
theoretical political science by Truman (1951/1971) who described the 
organization of unrepresented interests to countervail the exertion of 
influence by existing groups (as discussed in the previous paragraph), the 
creation of new interests by societal “disturbances”, and the restraint on 
interests’ ambitions by the conflicting loyalties growing out of overlapping 
membership.  This competition between interests was dubbed by Kelso as 
laissez-faire pluralism.  Buchanan and Tullock (1965/1999) discounted the 
effect of overlapping membership on interest group behavior by pointing out 
that, while individuals may be associated with multiple groups, their loyalties 
or concern will not be the same for each group; they will favor one issue area 
over another, thus valuing the power and influence of one group over another.  
They asserted that group competition will eventually result in a state of 
equilibrium, or “mutual exploitation”, assuming that groups are roughly equal 
in power (p.3.19.13).  McCormick and Tollison (1981) described interests 
competing in a market for influence over legislators in order to secure wealth 
transfers, based upon the “interest group theory of government”, which posits 
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that government policy is largely a vehicle for wealth redistribution.  Maloney 
and McCormick (1982) stated that “many existing laws and institutions can be 
explained as devices for distributing rents created by regulation” (p.121).  In 
such an environment, policies tend to distribute wealth to those interests that 
most efficiently exert political pressure (Becker, 1983). 
Groups may also choose to divide policy domains among themselves, 
coming in effect to a détente, agreeing not to compete over turf, but rather 
exerting their influence each within their respective fiefdoms.  Kelso labeled 
this cooperative pluralism.  So complete was the farm lobby’s monopolization 
within their domain during most of the twentieth century for example that 
Lowi (1969) described agricultural policy as the “private expropriation of 
public authority” (p.102).  McConnell (1953) described the agricultural lobby 
(specifically the Farm Bureau) as a “structure of power” that “extends from a 
base of social organization in a multitude of localities to a peak of direct 
influence over the exercise of governmental authority in the entire nation… It 
is a vertical structure that rises through every level of political organization in 
America” (p.173).  Wildavsky (1979/1987) questioned whether this trend was 
leading toward corporatism (p.72), as described by Schmitter (1974), Brand 
(1983) and Olson (1986).  Olson in fact described corporatism as displacing 
(laissez-faire) pluralism (p.166).   
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 In a corporatist regime, interest groups are either formed by or at the 
least legitimized by government itself, thus giving them a “quasi-public role” 
in the policy-making process (Brand, 1983, p.101).  This differs from Kelso’s 
cooperative pluralism largely in the manner by which the monopolization of 
the policy arena by an interest group, or a coalition of groups, comes into 
being:  Under cooperative pluralism, the monopoly forms through mutual 
agreement between interest groups; in a corporatist regime, the government 
plays an active role in establishing the interest group monopoly.  Whether the 
farm lobby’s position vis-à-vis policymakers was best described as cooperative 
pluralism or corporatism, it remains that the power it held in the policy-
making process was clearly substantial at the time of McConnell (1953) and 
Lowi (1969)10, but by the 1980s, following the rise of environmentalism in the 
public consciousness and within the lobbying community, although the farm 
lobby was still powerful, interaction between interest groups in the 
agricultural policy arena was becoming much more competitive (Browne, 
1988).  The behavior of the farm lobby can be expected to have changed 
accordingly.   
____________________ 
 
10 Hansen (1991) argued that the Farm Bureau’s access to policymakers had been eroded by the 
1960s due to policy splits with legislators over flexible versus strict price controls in the late 
1940s and an overstatement of popular support for their policy positions leading to political 
losses by friendly members of Congress in the late 1950s (pp.162-163).  This conflicts 
somewhat with Lowi’s description of the agricultural policy arena in 1969.  The discrepancy 
does nothing to effect the contentions made in this study. 
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In one chapter of his book on the role of interest groups in agricultural 
policy, Browne examined the collusion between agricultural interests and the 
newcomer conservation interests in the passage of the 1985 Farm Bill.  Groups 
that are typically on opposite sides of an issue may cooperate or collude if each 
group’s interests are served by a common goal.  Becker (1985) found that the 
choice of policy instruments is largely determined by the expected deadweight 
loss associated with them; if the deadweight loss is high, then taxpayer groups 
are more likely to oppose the policy.  However, Becker (1983) found that 
policies aimed at correcting market failures tend to distribute wealth to those 
with the most political influence; that is, if the group being subsidized is more 
efficient at exerting political pressure on lawmakers, then the policy may be 
passed in the end despite high deadweight losses.11  Which firm is most 
effective at exerting pressure is a function of the difference between the 
impact on the effected group and the costs associated with lobbying and 
organization costs, quantity divided by the size of the effected group 
(Peltzman, 1976).  As such, the size and diffuseness of the impact is a factor in 
the amount of lobbying that each interest group will be likely to carry out in 
favor of or in opposition to a policy.   
____________________ 
 
11 Becker (1983) defined efficiency in exerting pressure as relying in part upon ability to 
control the free-rider problem and upon group size, as relating to economies of scale (p.395).   
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In addition to interest groups, as pointed out by Heclo (1978), the 
public plays an important role in the policy process.  The contribution of the 
public shall therefore be discussed in the following section. 
 
Public Opinion and Public Policy 
A number of studies have examined the effect of public opinion on 
public policy.  Sabatier (1991) described past findings as showing a “strong 
correlation between important shifts in public opinion and changes in the 
general direction of governmental policy” (p.148, italics in original).  Manza 
and Cook (2001) concluded, “Where measured public opinion expresses a 
coherent mood or view on a particular policy question (or bundle of policy 
questions) in a way that is recognizable by political elites, it is more likely than 
not that the movement of policy will be in the direction of public opinion” 
(p.31), insofar as certain details of the policy making process are open to public 
view.12  Herring (1929/1967) posited that “public opinion… is king (and) the 
man who controls public opinion will easily control the nation itself” (p.60).   
Kingdon (1995) described how the political viability of an issue with 
the public, when combined with a “problem stream” and a policy option that 
____________________ 
 
12 See Hamilton (1997).  Even for salient issues, the selection of specific instruments for 
carrying out highly technical policies are often not closely scrutinized by the public, thus 
leaving interest groups in a stronger position to influence legislative votes [cf. Heclo (1978)]. 
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has been sufficiently “softened” over time, elevates an issue to policy-makers’ 
agendas.  Key (1961) described public opinion as a series of “dikes” that set a 
range of discretion within which governmental action is channeled.  Key saw 
this as a long-term process by which the public does away with elected 
officials who do not keep pace with the tenor of public opinion.   
Key differentiated public opinion into supportive consensus, in which 
case the public supports a particular policy approach to an issue, and 
permissive consensus, by which the public is of a certain mind regarding an 
issue, but does not support a specific policy approach but in effect gives 
lawmakers consent to do something.  The latter form of consensus is not 
generally as closely tied to action taken by policy makers as the former, since it 
does not carry as immediate a threat of reprisal – lawmakers are given 
permission to act but without a mandate.   
Downs (1957) described policy makers as vote maximizers who will 
spend on programs to the point that the number of votes gained by an 
additional dollar is equal to the votes lost by the marginal dollar taken from 
taxpayers to finance it (p.52).  Downs predicted that lawmakers will follow the 
will of the majority when it can be clearly identified (see Arrow, 1951); 
lawmakers are most certain to follow majority rule when the public holds a 
“consensus of intensities” – that is, there is agreement as to which issues are 
most important – as well as a “consensus of views”, or agreement on which 
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policies should be applied to the issues (p.67).  Mayhew (1974) likewise said 
that lawmakers will in general heed the public will because their goal is 
ultimately to maximize votes in order to gain reelection; consistently ignoring 
or snubbing public preferences would be counterproductive to this goal.   
Per contra, a number of studies have exposed putative weaknesses in 
the transmittal of public preferences to the policy-making process.  Anderson 
(1990) pointed out that the influence of individuals in the private sector is 
limited to the degree that citizens choose not to vote or become otherwise 
politically involved; nonetheless, he was careful not to imply that the public 
taken as a whole had no effect on policy.   
Lindblom (1968) saw individual citizens as largely inactive in the 
political process, but those who wished are able to gain access to what 
Lindblom called “proximate policy makers” through political parties and 
through interest group participation.  According to Hansen (1991), interests 
influence policy by directing lawmakers’ attention to one set of issues over 
another; this influence includes picking and choosing which voters’ opinions 
they will represent.  Schattschneider (1960) argued that, when interest groups 
hold sway in the absence of strong political parties, only elites – those with 
resources to organize effective lobbies – are able to influence public policy.  
Becker (1983) came to similar conclusions.  McConnell (1953) documented a 
similar trend within the agricultural lobby, in which “big” or at least “the 
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more prosperous” farmers dominate (p.151).  McConnell (1966) likewise 
described interests, or “private associations”, as oligarchic and without 
sufficient means to protect the interests of non-elite members.  In both 
instances, McConnell’s findings support Schattschneider’s contentions of the 
elitist tendencies of interest-dominated governance.   
Zulauf, Guither and Henderson (1987) demonstrated this via a 1984 
survey that included agribusiness and farm operators in Illinois and Ohio 
regarding preferences for the 1985 Farm Bill.  Zulauf et al. found that the final 
version of the Farm Bill more closely reflected the preferences of large farms 
than those of smaller farms.  Olson (1965), however, argued that, while groups 
may sometimes fall into furthering the interests of leadership over that of its 
members, this will ultimately be limited by the demise of groups that fail to 
serve the interests of its membership (pp.5-6).   
 Page and Shapiro (1983) addressed the question of the causal 
relationship between public preferences and public policy by conducting a 
study comparing national polls conducted between 1935 and 1979 and public 
policy passed during the study period.  The study examined policies for 
congruence with opinion ranging between two years prior to polling samples 
to four years after.  They found that in a majority of instances, policy followed 
public opinion, with direction of causality being indicated by the lag between 
the appearance of a shift in public opinion and the passage of the new policy.  
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Further, they found that opinion appeared to have a greater effect on policy 
when the issues were highly salient and when changes in public opinion were 
sustained over a long period of time – more transient shifts in opinion were 
found to have little effect on policy.  Interestingly, Page and Shapiro found a 
greater congruence between public opinion and policy when the change in 
opinion represented a leftward shift along the political spectrum; they 
speculate that this could be attributable to the overall liberal tendency of 
policy during the study period. 
 
Conclusion 
 The foregoing review lays the foundation for the remainder of this 
study.  In the following chapter, the CRP is examined in the context of the 
policy typology literature examined in this chapter, and the policy 
environment in which the CRP was formulated and adopted is scrutinized in 
light of the literature regarding the role of interest groups and public opinion 
in the policy process.  This will serve as further evidence pointing to the true 
purpose for which the CRP was enacted.   
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CHAPTER 5 
  
DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS AND THE CRP 
 
 
When the 1985 Farm Bill came up for consideration, farm and 
conservation lobbies colluded to seek passage of the Conservation Title, which 
included the Conservation Reserve Program (see Browne, 1988).  This chapter 
will formulate a theory as to why this putatively environmentally-oriented 
program enjoyed the support of the farm lobby.  If rationality dictates that 
interest groups are expected to behave in their members’ interests, by 
definition, then it follows that the CRP was expected to benefit farmers.  That 
the program does indeed benefit farmers was demonstrated by a number of 
studies (for example, Shoemaker, 1989a; Johnson, Wolcott & Aradhyula, 1990; 
Shaik, Helmers & Atwood, 2005).   
It is not the goal of this research endeavor to suggest that the CRP has 
had no effect in reducing the amount of erodible land cultivated or that it has 
had no success at achieving the stated goal of reducing overall topsoil erosion.  
Indeed, Newman (1988), for example, reported a 241 million ton reduction in 
soil erosion in the Great Plains states through the first four program sign-ups 
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(p.58).13  However, Chapman’s (1988) comment that the preservation of 
erodible land was the true purpose for the CRP (p.11), as well as Bedenbaugh’s 
(1988) argument that the “CRP is not viewed as primarily a reduction 
adjustment program… it is a conservation program that will have a desired 
impact on reducing surplus production” (p.17), bears some scrutiny in light of 
the benefits that the program generates for participating farmers.  For 
example, Shoemaker (1989a) stated, “The primary aim of the CRP is to protect 
the nation’s highly erodible cropland and to conserve and protect water and 
wildlife resources,” but then added that the CRP “may also… provide financial 
relief to farmers” (p.1).  Shoemaker continued, “The CRP may have raised 
returns to enrolled farmers whose land would have earned less if they had not 
enrolled and instead had farmed or rented out the land” (p.3).  Johnson et al. 
(1990) referred to “distributional and rent-creating features” of policies that 
generate positive benefits that are priced into agricultural land values (p.204).  
Shaik et al. (2005) did in fact find that a 10 percent increase in farm program 
payments (CRP rental payments would be an example) can be expected to 
increase agricultural land values by 3 percent.   
____________________ 
 
13 This number is based upon the reduction per acre enrolled in the CRP.  As such, this 
number would not take into account any offsetting effects such as slippage. 
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Benbrook (1979) advocated the integration of existing agricultural 
commodity programs and soil conservation programs in order to offset years of 
stimulative programs that had disregarded effects on the environment.  While 
Benbrook’s focus was on soil conservation, he also supported the continued 
provision of income support to farmers.  Commodity programs, like those 
referenced by Benbrook, boost market prices by both restricting output (by 
permitting the number of acres that can be planted in program crops) and 
guaranteeing target prices for program crops; this enhances the 
competitiveness of domestic farmers in the international market as well as 
protecting the competitiveness of small farmers in the domestic market (see 
also Gardner, 1987b).  Shoemaker argued that, insofar as the CRP causes the 
value of enrolled land to appreciate due to the future stream of rental 
payments, it resembles a commodity program, which often increases the 
market value of lands used for planting program crops.   
In addition to this, the CRP, like traditional commodity programs, 
restricts commodity supply by removing land from production (the extent to 
which this actually occurs is of course related to the question of slippage).  
Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, when introducing his amendment to the 1985 
Farm Bill to increase the maximum acreage for the CRP from 25 million acres 
– as it was in the version of the bill passed in the House of Representatives – to 
45 million acres, stated, “With current commodity surpluses depressing U.S. 
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farm prices, I believe such an expansion of the conservation reserve would be 
beneficial” (U.S. Congress, 1985, p.33464).14  A report by the interest group 
American Farmland Trust (AFT) stated the underlying theme in no uncertain 
terms, asserting that, historically at least, “conservation was definitely a by-
product of production controls, rather than a central aim” (AFT, 1984, p.56). 
As discussed in an earlier chapter, soil conservation has long been tied 
to agricultural policy.  It is clear why environmental goals were added to the 
1938 revision of the Agricultural Adjustment Act – as a reply to the “General 
Welfare” findings in the Butler case – and why the 1956 CRP under the Soil 
Bank Act was passed with support from farm interests – to reduce crop 
surpluses; conservation was given as a secondary objective.  Further 
examination of the political reasons behind the framing of these historic 
policies shall be left for other studies, but the question for the present 
discussion is why the 1985 CRP, though markedly similar to its 1956 
namesake, and passed within a remarkably similar policy environment, was 
framed as a primarily conservation-oriented policy as opposed to one that is 
primarily directed at boosting farm incomes.   
____________________ 
 
14 The Nunn Amendment was added as an amendment to the amendment proposed by Senator 
Robert Dole (Kansas), which was adopted by the Senate.  The Conference Committee adopted 
the Senate provision for CRP acreage limits when reconciling the two versions of the bill (U.S. 
House, 1985).  Chapman (1988) described this as “somewhat of a surprise because they usually 
just split the difference” (p.13).   
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CRP as a Distributive Policy 
Viewing the CRP as a distributive/clientele policy, as defined by Lowi 
(1964) and Wilson (1973), offers significant insight as to the reasons why farm 
interests were so willing to support its passage in 1985.  As just noted, the CRP 
passed in 1956 under the Soil Bank Act was framed by advocates as primarily 
intended to benefit farmers by reducing crop surpluses.  However, in 1985 
when the new CRP was passed, it was cited as primarily a conservation 
program.  The substantive differences therefore between the 1985 CRP and 
that of 1956 are minor, but the policy images – the way in which a policy is 
depicted by members of the policy community (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991) – 
are quite different.15   
By seeking a synthesis of the policy typologies advanced by Lowi (1964; 
1972), Wilson (1973) and Spitzer (1987), the nature of the CRP can be 
characterized by identifying the beneficiaries and those upon whom costs are 
imposed.  The CRP both attempts to regulate farmer behavior vis-à-vis 
resource utilization and provides largesse to farmers, the cost of which is 
____________________ 
 
15 Baumgartner and Jones state, “Because images have implications for which actors in society 
will be attracted to a given debate, policymakers have the incentives to attempt to manipulate 
them, and many political scientists have noted their attempts to change public or elite 
understandings of the nature of important policy questions” (p.1047).  In this case, 
policymakers depicted the CRP in such a way as to advance it in an environment in which 
conservation was a growing concern and farm subsidies were seen in a less favorable light as in 
previous years. 
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diffused among taxpayers at large – in other words, the program contains both 
regulatory and distributive elements.  If the CRP is primarily a regulatory 
policy therefore, to use Lowi’s terminology, one might expect costs to be 
imposed upon farmers as the regulated party insofar as the regulation would 
restrict the farmer from engaging in behavior that he otherwise might based 
on profit-maximization.16  Indeed, the CRP has the (immediate at least) effect 
of influencing resource allocation decisions made by farmers in terms of 
reducing cultivation on highly erodible land.  However, two interrelated 
factors undercut the view of the CRP as a primarily regulatory policy. 
First, participation in the CRP is not compulsory.  Farmers are not 
prevented by edict from cultivating erodible land, insofar as this program is 
concerned.  Only those farmers who choose to enter into contract with the 
USDA face any compulsion against cultivation on the lands in question, and 
even then the threatened penalties are limited to cessation or surrender of the 
benefits received by the farmer under the program; viewed in light of the 
earlier discussion of Baldwin’s (1971) positive inducements that are anticipated 
within the framework of the easement contract, this arrangement is not 
____________________ 
 
16 For example, if a program restricts the production of corn to a level below which a given 
farm owner planned on sowing in a particular year, then, ceterus paribus, a cost would be 
imposed on that farmer in the form of lower profits because he would necessarily have to sow 
more of a less profitable crop or else leave the land idle, given the assumption that in the 
absence of regulation a farm owner will allocate his resources to the production of 
commodities in the proportion that will generate the maximum level of profit. 
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equivalent to command and control regulation.17  Second, while cost is 
imposed upon farmers (in terms of opportunity costs) by the voluntary 
restriction placed on their use of resources, these costs are at least offset by 
payments made to the farmers for their participation in the program.  It is said 
they are “at least offset” because, assuming rationality on the part of the 
farmer, and given that the program is not compulsory, no farmer would be 
expected to enter into the contract unless the return from the transaction were 
at least equal to the discounted stream of expected return from cultivating the 
land over the life of the contract, or from selling the land, a potentially Pareto-
improving transfer.18   
In order to address the question of why agricultural interests favored 
passage of the CRP, it is necessary to further explore this question of whether 
the policy is indeed primarily distributive or primarily regulatory.  If the 
program is regulatory in nature, it would fall under Ripley and Franklin’s 
(1980) protective regulatory regime (given the stated environmental goals of 
____________________ 
 
17 Chapman’s (1988) description of the CRP as a “the carrot” in the Conservation Title is 
supportive of this view (p.13).    
18 Kaldor (1939) illustrated this principle in the context of a commodity program, the repeal of 
which created an effective reduction in income to farmers (due to the decrease in the price of 
the commodity).  Kaldor posited that a transfer from those who benefited from the policy 
change (through taxation) to farmers would offset the shift in income distribution while 
maintaining the overall social benefit resulting from an increase in the availability of the 
commodity at a lower price.  As such, the final outcome is potentially Pareto-improving.  In 
the case at hand, society at large presumably benefits from the decrease in erosion resulting 
from the retirement of CRP land and the farmers are compensated for their lost productivity.   
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the policy), which raises the question of why it was not opposed by farm 
interests; if it is distributive, the focus of the question turns to the stated 
conservation goals of the program and the level of importance that they held 
with policymakers – particularly the lobbyists who exerted pressure on 
lawmakers for passage of the program – when the program was formulated and 
adopted.  The task at hand is to resolve this grey area.   
Policies often have attributes of more than one type (Steinberger, 1980, 
pp.186-187; Johnson et al, 1990, p.204; Stone, 2002, p.224); classifying policies 
therefore requires identifying which of the attributes are more central to the 
policy.   
Under Spitzer’s (1987) typology, agricultural commodity programs are 
classified as “mixed regulatory”; as discussed earlier in this chapter, the CRP is 
in its essence a commodity program.  Spitzer’s classification recognizes that the 
level of coercion in such a program is much lower than that seen in a pure 
regulatory policy – in the vein of the 1972 Clean Air Amendments, for 
example.  However, classifying the CRP as mixed regulatory would consider 
only the strength of the regulatory element without considering the strength 
of the distributive element.  As such, while the Spitzer typology moves the 
analysis in the proper direction, it does not go far enough in this case. 
Gauging the strength of the distributive element versus the regulatory 
element requires identification of the primary beneficiaries.  If the policy is 
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primarily regulatory, the primary beneficiary – i.e. the party receiving the 
most concentrated benefits – can be expected to be conservation interests and 
the policy can be classified as entrepreneurial according to Wilson’s (1973) 
typology; if it is primarily distributive, it follows that the primary beneficiaries 
will be the farmers themselves, which would make the policy fall under 
clientele politics by Wilson’s typology.  In the case of the CRP, the benefits to 
farmers – direct payment as well as benefits accruing from surplus reduction – 
are far more concentrated than the benefits expected to accrue through 
environmental impacts of soil erosion reduction, which would be expected to 
be quite diffuse.  This aspect of the policy further complicates viewing it as 
other than primarily clientele and distributive in nature.  As groups tend to 
behave in such a way as to maximize their own interests, which interests were 
vocal in support of the policy will provide verification of this conclusion by 
identifying who most expected to benefit.  Browne (1988) stated: “Questions of 
social justice, environmental need, and nutritional value may be given some 
perfunctory public attention, but the search for financial advantage structures 
the lobbying agenda of farm and agri-business interests” (p.146).  This would 
seem to indicate that if farm interests supported the CRP, then there was the 
expectation of “financial advantage”. 
In sum, the reasons for passing the CRP in 1985 were the same as those 
given by Eisenhower in 1956, albeit by a different mechanism – the means by 
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which the 1956 CRP was intended to aid farmers was through creating upward 
pressure on commodity prices.  The focus in the 1985 program was on the 
income provided through CRP rental payments.  Shoemaker (1989b) found 
that landowners are able to increase land values through the application of 
CRP rental payments due to asymmetry of information – that is, the 
landowner may overstate the productivity of the land in order to extract a 
larger rental payment from the program.  Shoemaker further cited evidence of 
increased value of program land allowing its use as collateral for additional 
land purchases – these benefits are independent of any effects that the 
program may have on surplus reduction, that is, they directly result from the 
positive inducements.  Given these factors, it becomes difficult to classify the 
program’s positive inducements as compulsory in nature or the program as 
regulatory as defined under Lowi’s regime. 
The contention of the program’s focus upon largesse generated by 
rental payments as opposed to surplus reduction is further supported by 
Babcock, Carter and Schmitz (1990), who pointed out that taxpayer advocates’ 
attempts to promote output restrictions over raising target prices, which 
requires taxpayers to foot the bill of compensating farmers when actual prices 
fall below the target price, were unsuccessful due to opposition by agribusiness 
interests.  Given that the agribusiness lobby prevailed in this portion of the 
Farm Bill, it stands to reason that it would not support a program strictly 
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aimed at reducing production in order to raise commodity prices in the 
Conservation Title.  Assuming the correctness of this current study’s assertion 
that conservation was not the purpose in fact for the CRP (for the sake of this 
point of argument), this leaves only program rental payments as the motivator 
for agriculture’s support for the program.  Although, as will presently be seen 
from testimony, not all farm interests were in lockstep with this as the prime 
mechanism, the underlying theme of income support is apparent.   
Illustrating the income-enhancing effects of CRP rental payments, 
Lambert, Sullivan, Claassen and Foreman (2006) found that approximately 50 
percent of farmers participating in land retirement programs like the CRP produce 
no commodities – that is, they receive income from their land by renting it to the 
government.  Lambert et al. further found that these farm owners tend to be older, 
operate smaller farms and are more reliant on non-farm income than those who 
participate in conservation programs that do not involve the retirement of land.  In 
essence, CRP rental payments serve to provide sufficient income to allow 
retirement from agriculture for small farmers who may be most susceptible to 
downturns in the agricultural market.    
 
Hearings 
In light of this, farm interest representatives, as well as individual 
farmers, came to the hearings for the 1985 Farm Bill seeking economic relief.  
When transcripts of the House committee hearings on conservation measures 
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in the 1985 Farm Bill are examined, conservation groups were noticeably all 
but absent (U.S. House, 1984).  In the three sessions of hearings before the 
House Subcommittee on Conservation, Credit, and Rural Development in 
1984, which preceded passage of the 1985 Farm Bill, fifty-five witnesses 
appeared or submitted material; of these, only four were affiliated with entities 
that were clearly conservation-oriented – three of these were federal 
agencies.19   
The continued dominant standing of farm interests was evident from 
their preferred position at the front of the queue in the 1984 House hearings, 
as witnesses most favored by the Congressional committees are typically 
scheduled to testify first on the first day (Fritschler & Hoefler, 1996).  The first 
of the conservation organizations represented on the witness list was preceded 
by representatives of the Small Business Association, catfish farmers, Women 
Involved in Farm Economics, dairy farmers, a cattleman and a soybean farmer.  
A summary of the interests represented at the hearing is presented in Table 1.20 
The overriding theme of testimony during the 1984 hearings was that 
of the financial hardships being experienced by farmers in the current market 
____________________ 
 
19 Represented were the Alabama Association of Conservation Districts, the Agricultural 
Stabilization and Conservation Service, the Soil Conservation Service, and a local field office of 
the SCS.   
20 Tables do not include material submitted by witnesses not appearing.  Taxonomy is the 
author’s. 
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(beyond the fact that the subcommittee’s domain obviously included farm 
credit as well as conservation issues).  According to numbers presented by the 
Alabama Farm Bureau Federation, farm debt had grown nationally from $53 
billion in 1970 to $217.5 billion in 1983 (p.56).21  A representative of the 
interest group Rural America declared: 
I would just like to state that if as other speakers have said dramatic 
Federal action is not forth coming in the next year, we could likely lose 
fully one-third of all family farm units throughout the Midwest and the 
United States in the next 12 to 24 months (p.162). 
    
An Iowa Farm Bureau representative went so far as to describe the state of 
American agriculture as a “farm economic depression” (p.161).  A 
representative of the Iowa Farm Unity Coalition cited a “dramatic drop in land 
prices” (indicative of the falling profitability of agriculture) as a major problem 
being faced by farmers (p.126) – interestingly, boosting land values was one of 
the benefits of CRP rental payments cited by Shoemaker (1989a).22   
Conservation received very little mention at the 1984 House hearings.  
The only testimonies focused on soil conservation as a primary concern were 
____________________ 
 
21 The numbers presented were not adjusted for inflation.  Converted into 2000 dollars using 
the GDP Chain-Type deflator, farm debt increased from $192.5 billion in 1970 to $333.5 
billion in 1983. 
22 It is worth noting that Iowa received the largest number of CRP contracts over the first 
twelve sign-ups, and ranked fifth among the states in the number of acres enrolled.  All of the 
other states in the following discussion saw substantial acreage enrolled in the program as well 
(see Appendix). 
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that of the president of the Alabama Association of Conservation Districts 
(U.S. House, 1984, pp.15-18) and a letter submitted by a representative of an 
Indiana field office of the SCS (p.324).  Conservation was prominently 
mentioned by two other witnesses – one the chairman of the Young Farmer 
Committee of the Indiana Farm Bureau (pp.325-326), the other a resident of 
Masonville, Iowa in a hand-written letter submitted to the committee (pp.263-
264).  The latter posited that conservation measures “would greatly alleviate 
lake siltation and water pollution and at the same time reduce part of our 
overproduction of grain” (p.263).   
It was quite a different matter in hearings before the Senate Committee on 
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry held in 1983 and 1985 (U.S. Senate, 1983a; 
1985).  Conservation districts, conservation interests and state and federal 
governmental agencies involved in conservation policy were much more 
heavily represented on the day of testimony devoted to conservation and 
extension issues than in the House hearings, as indicated in Tables 2 and 3.23  
Additionally, a much larger contingent of non-governmental conservation 
interest groups were present.  Farmers and farm interests were also well-
represented.   
____________________ 
 
23
 Conservation groups and conservation districts are listed separately in Tables 2 and 3, because 
conservation districts are local organizations comprised largely of landowners.  As such, they can 
be expected to be more friendly to farmer interests than typical conservation interest groups such 
as the Sierra Club or the Audubon Society, for example. 
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Table 1.  
 
Hearings before House Subcommittee on Conservation,  
Credit and Rural Development 
 
Date/Location of 
Hearing 
Interest represented Number of 
Witnesses 
Farmer or Farming Organization 7 
Farm Supply 1 
Business/Development 1 
Commodity Distribution/Handling 0 
Finance 4 
Conservation Group 1 
Government Agency 1 
04-May-1984 
Selma, Alabama 
Academia 
 
0 
Farmer or Farming Organization 12 
Farm Supply 1 
Business/Development 2 
Commodity Distribution/Handling 1 
Finance 3 
Conservation Group 0 
Government Agency 1 
06-July-1984 
Indianola, Iowa 
Academia 
 
1 
Farmer or Farming Organization 7 
Farm Supply 1 
Business/Development 0 
Commodity Distribution/Handling 0 
Finance 2 
Conservation Group 0 
Government Agency 1 
08-October-1984 
Washington, Indiana 
Academia 
 
1 
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As predicted, testimony by farm interests was in favor of soil 
conservation measures.  The president of the Hinds County (Mississippi) Farm 
Bureau, in speaking of the benefits that soil conservation in farming states 
generates for non-farming states, testified that “it’s only logical that they help 
us by supporting a strong national [as opposed to state-financed] program of 
soil and water conservation” (U.S. Senate, 1983a, p.19).  This essentially 
constituted a call for income transfer from non-farm states to farm states.  The 
president of the Mississippi Farm Bureau Federation said, in response to a 
question regarding the need for incentives to farmers to undertake 
conservation: 
I definitely think that there needs to be some incentive… I think that is 
one of the points that can be used by farmers on the diverted land or 
the conserving acres, is that they can use natural cover… I think that if 
farmers were offered some payment-in-kind type of a program, that 
they would use more conserving acre crops (U.S. Senate, 1983a, p.28). 
 
 Both conservation and farm interests alike, including the Farm Bureau 
(U.S. Senate, 1983a, p.115), expressed support for a conservation program 
patterned after the payment-in-kind (PIK) program.  PIK was first initiated in 
1961 for the purpose of surplus reduction; the program paid farmers with 
government-held surplus commodities, which could then be sold, in exchange 
for reducing the amount of crops planted (see ERS, 1984).  The program went 
by the wayside during the high-demand 1970s, but was reactivated by the  
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Table 2. 
Hearings before Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, 
Subcommittee on Soil and Water Conservation, Forestry, and Environment 
 
Date/Location of 
Hearing 
Interest represented Number of 
Witnesses 
Farmer or Farming Organization 5 
Conservation Districts 2 
Forestry 0 
Conservation Group 1 
Government Agency 5 
Academia 0 
May 31, 1983 
Jackson, Mississippi 
Other 
 
3 
Farmer or Farming Organization 4 
Conservation Districts 6 
Forestry 0 
Conservation Group 5 
Government Agency 7 
Academia 2 
June 1, 1983 
Louisville, Kentucky 
Other 
 
2 
Farmer or Farming Organization 7 
Conservation Districts 6 
Forestry 0 
Conservation Group 2 
Government Agency 6 
Academia 2 
June 13, 1983 
Ames, Iowa 
Other 
 
6 
Farmer or Farming Organization 3 
Conservation Districts 8 
Forestry 0 
Conservation Group 3 
Government Agency 10 
Academia 0 
June 24, 1983 
Brattleboro, 
Vermont 
Other 
 
0 
Farmer or Farming Organization 1 
Conservation Districts 1 
Forestry 0 
Conservation Group 2 
Government Agency 1 
Academia 0 
June 28, 1983 
Washington, DC 
Other 
 
0 
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USDA in 1983 in response to the declining economic condition of US 
agriculture.  In essence, PIK, very much a distributive policy, allowed farmers 
to cultivate fewer crops while retaining the same effective level of output, in 
terms of marketable commodity.  An Illinois dairy farmer suggested that 
rather than farms having a commodity base, they should have a “conservation 
base”, for purposes of PIK (U.S. Senate, 1983a, p.160).  A representative of the 
Iowa Farm Bureau Federation described a conference held by the organization 
in 1983 “to emphasize the soil conservation opportunities that have been made 
available by the PIK program” (p.222).  American Farmland Trust likewise 
testified about the efficacy of using PIK as a template for a new conservation 
program (pp.230, 342-343).  Also of interest is an exchange between Mary Kay 
Thatcher of the American Farm Bureau Federation and a member of the 
committee: 
 
 
Table 3 
 
Hearings before Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry 
 
Farmer or Farming Organization 6 
Conservation Districts 2 
Forestry 2 
Conservation Group 6 
Government Agency 1 
Academia 3 
Governor of Idaho (Representing 
Committee on Agriculture, National 
Governors’ Association) 
 
 
1 
15-April-1985 
  
Other 
 
3 
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Ms. THATCHER.  Our members have been very supportive of the PIK 
program.  It has given many of them a lot of hope for the first time in 3 
or 4 years.  Most of them, especially the wheat farmers, would like to 
see the PIK program extended another year… 
 
Senator JEPSEN.  Who should pay for conservation…? 
 
Ms. THATCHER.  I think a lot of our members would like to have it be 
some type of a joint effort, some type of a cost sharing between possibly 
the State and Federal Government and the farmers themselves…. 
 
Senator JEPSEN.  Do you think that your organization would be 
interested in keeping some of the acres in a multiyear, long-term set-
aside for wildlife feed and habitat purposes, if they could do it on a dual 
basis of conserving soil and providing this, too? 
 
Ms. THATCHER.  They might be (U.S. Senate, 1983a, p.355). 
 
Three months later, in hearings before the same committee, a representative of 
the National Association of Wheat Growers stated: 
Farmers would welcome the opportunity of participating in both short- 
and long-run conservation programs offering cost-sharing in cash or in-
kind.  For farmers who are uncertain of their program participation 
over a long-term period, conservation payments to assist in maintaining 
idled acres during a particular season would be helpful in assuring the 
best conservation techniques.  Supplemental payment could also be 
helpful in prolonging the farmers’ interest in supply management 
programs, and permanent land retirement (U.S. Senate, 1983b, p.94). 
 
Although not all CRP payments are made “in-kind”, the CRP is in 
essence a variation on this concept of an environmentally-focused PIK 
program.  As in the case of PIK, the CRP allows farmers to receive 
compensation for commodities that they putatively would have grown 
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without the capital expenditure necessary for cultivation.24  A representative 
of Southern Iowa Agricultural Boosters testified in a prepared statement for 
the 1985 hearings: “In order for good conservation practices to be 
implemented, there must be a PROFIT in agriculture” (U.S. Senate, 1985, 
p.670, emphasis in original).  A representative of the American Forestry 
Association, when questioned about the level of incentive that would be 
required for farmers to remove land from production to plant with trees, 
replied, “With the net profit figure that many people are experiencing today 
with corn, soybeans, and wheat, almost anything would look better” (p.277), 
indicating a view of the CRP as a means of bolstering farm income. 
 
The Role of Public Opinion 
In the years leading up to the 1985 Farm Bill, pro-environmental public 
sentiment was certain to have been very prominent on policy makers’ minds.  
Polls taken between 1980 and 1985 revealed a substantial tide of public 
opinion in favor of environmental protection.  A Washington Post editorial 
quoted pollster Lou Harris as describing public attitude on the environment as 
“one of the most overwhelming and clearest we have ever recorded in our 25 
____________________ 
 
24 It is telling that a letter inserted into the Congressional Record (1985) opposed “another 
acreage diversion PIK program” due to its effects on quantity of production (p.27045); this 
letter was written by the manager of a fertilizer plant, which clearly gave him a stake in 
maintaining high production levels (see Babcock et al, 1990). 
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years of surveying public opinion in this country… [The environment] 
happens to be one of the sacred cows of the American people” (“It’s a 
Depression”, 1981).  A poll taken by the New York Times and CBS in 1981 
stated, “A large majority of the American public supports continued strong 
protection of the environment even if it requires economic sacrifice,” although 
the poll does indicate that “the public is not ready to accept all of the demands 
of environmentalists, and in some cases would accept such tradeoffs as 
between energy development and easing of environmental protection” 
(Shabecoff, 1981).  However, less than one year later, after the House of 
Representatives voted to block the selling of gas and oil leases in national 
forests by the Department of the Interior, Democratic Congressman Don 
Albosta and two Republican Senators, Alan Simpson and Malcolm Wallop, 
cited “constituent pressure” as the reason behind their vote (King, 1982).   
When the Clean Air Act came up for reauthorization in 1982, “virtually 
all public opinion polls” showed strong support for maintaining the act’s 
provisions against attempts by industrial groups to weaken it (Shabecoff, 
1982).  A 1982 Gallup-Newsweek telephone poll of 1,018 adults found that 54 
percent indicated that they would be less likely to vote for congressional 
candidates who favored lifting environmental regulations, even when these 
regulations have led to price increases (Gallup, 1982a).  This trend was 
supported by another New York Times and CBS poll, which found that 58 
 82 
percent of respondents agreed that ''protecting the environment is so 
important that requirements and standards cannot be too high and continuing 
environmental improvements must be made, regardless of cost” (Shabecoff, 
1983a).  Nearly four years earlier, a Harris poll found that a combined 77 
percent of those surveyed felt that the prevention of soil erosion was slightly 
to much more imperative than holding down regulatory costs (Harris, 1980).   
In addition to these, the environmental lobby showed its prowess in 
Washington, DC in that same year when Secretary of the Interior James Watt 
and EPA Administrator Anne McGill Burford ran afoul of environmental and 
conservation groups for their handling of public lands and industrial 
regulation, respectively.  A news report at the time stated: “While the 
environmental groups did not precipitate the crises that brought Mr. Watt and 
Mrs. Burford to grief, there is little dispute that the unrelenting drumfire of 
criticism that the groups leveled at the two officials created a climate of public 
opinion that made the officials vulnerable” (Shabecoff, 1983b); two-thirds of 
respondents to a poll by the Washington Post and ABC News indicated an 
awareness of the controversy within the EPA (Sussman, 1983).   
When President Ronald Reagan ran for reelection in 1984, the 
environment was a major campaign issue – an unnamed aid to a Republican 
member of Congress described the issue as a “fire… on the verge of becoming 
a conflagration” (Hoffman, 1983).  In a Gallup poll, 44 percent of respondents 
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described the environment as “important” in the presidential campaign, while 
35 percent identified it as “most important” (Gallup, 1983).  Certainly, farm 
interests could not have helped but take note of this increase in standing of 
environmentalism in the public arena.   
Whether public opinion influences public policy per se, or if the 
congruence between public opinion and policy found by Page and Shapiro 
(1983) was the result of elitist influence upon public opinion (see Manza & 
Cook, 2001), media coverage of the sustained movement in public opinion in 
favor of conservationism would be an indicator of the possible future direction 
of policy nonetheless.  Indeed, Gallup (1982b) found that conservation 
outranked agricultural aid to farmers in importance among respondents, 
although the difference was just outside of the margin of error.25  However, 
the crucial issue is not so much whether public opinion in actuality has a 
positive correlation to policy, but rather whether farm lobbyists had a rational 
belief that movement in public sentiment in favor of conservation would 
result in policies that would threaten agricultural rents.26   
____________________ 
 
25 When asked what policy areas should receive “first consideration” for federal funding “[i]f 
and when more federal money from Washington is available”, 18 percent of respondents 
supported Pollution/Conservation while Agricultural Aid was supported by 13 percent. 
26 See McCallum (1980) for a discussion of rational expectations and decision-making. 
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If indeed farm interests expected increased pressure from public 
opinion and the activity of conservation interests for policies that could be 
detrimental to their ability to extract largesse from farm legislation, they 
would be expected to respond in a rational manner.  This response would be 
such that would preserve the farm interests’ power by diffusing any perceived 
threat.  That the farm lobby advocated the policies laid out in the 
Conservation Title of the Farm Bill is a strong indication that farmers expected 
to benefit from the included programs, such as the CRP, and it is reasonable to 
see farmers’ choice to support these provisions as a response to the threat 
posed by the rising environmental lobby and the pro-environmental shift in 
public opinion.   
 
Responding to a Potential Threat 
Browne (1988) articulated several overriding issues that interest groups 
recognized when the time came for formulating the 1985 Farm Bill.  Among 
these was concern over farm solvency.  As previously noted, a record number 
of farms were declaring bankruptcy due to economic hardship resulting from a 
drop in demand in the international market, which followed large increases in 
production to meet the international demand which had been booming in the 
1970s.  Farm bills had for the past several cycles been aimed at encouraging 
increased production, but now the pressure was on for Congress to formulate a 
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policy to bring the agricultural sector in for a soft landing, as it were.  A 
second concern that Browne identified was the impending 1986 election, 
which a number of legislators from farm states were eyeing with some 
apprehension about backlash from the farming crisis.   
Conservation groups were active in lobbying for conservation measures 
in the Farm Bill, as may be expected.  Environmental initiatives that would 
have an effect on agriculture were already in the works within other sectors – 
pesticide regulation was becoming a larger issue in the early 1980s with the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s decision to issue an emergency ban on 
ethylene dibromide (EDB) in 1983 (EPA, 2007), which, although done for 
reasons of safety of farm workers in addition to broader environmental 
concerns, imposed a significant cost on farms27; legislation amending the Clean 
Water Act (CWA) to address non-point pollution sources, including fertilizers 
and pesticides from agricultural runoff, was also under consideration during 
this time.28   
____________________ 
 
27 A letter written by the American Farm Bureau Federation to the EPA stated: “the 
government had better be prepared to pay farmers for as much as 40 percent of the grain 
harvested this year” (Peterson, 1984). 
28 Section 319 of the CWA (101-Stat-52), which authorized grants to states, territories and 
Indian tribes to implement programs to reduce pollution from non-point sources, was passed 
in 1987.  During the period of the debate over the 1985 Farm Bill, Congress proposed but 
failed to pass amended versions of the CWA: HR 3282 and S 431 in 1984, and HR 8 and S 1128 
in 1985 (CQ, 1984, p.330; 1985, p.205). 
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American Farmland Trust, an interest group made up of both farmers 
and conservationists, published a report entitled “Soil Conservation in 
America: What Do We Have to Lose?” (AFT, 1984) that Browne (1988) 
described as being “the major instrument in articulating a moderate and 
intentionally reasonable message” that agribusiness interests found palatable 
(p.232).  The AFT report gave twenty-three policy recommendations for 
improving soil conservation efforts by federal and state and local governments, 
most of which involved improving classification of land erodibility and the 
means of publishing this information.   
Most relevant to this study, of course, is the recommendation that the 
1985 Farm Bill establish a program granting multi-year contracts to farmers for 
enrolling acres in a conservation reserve.  Farm interests, including the Farm 
Bureau, the National Farmers Union, and the National Farmers Organization, 
got on board with the AFT recommendations.  The reason Browne gave for 
this was that the conservation measures proposed by AFT did not conflict with 
income support provisions of the bill.  In fact, as discussed previously in this 
chapter, the conservation reserve provision supplemented them.  Put another 
way, the CRP fulfilled the goals of both farmers and environmentalists (Leitch, 
1987; see also Maloney & McCormick, 1982).  Browne stated that this 
provided a rallying point allowing farming and conservation interests to build 
coalitions facilitating advancement of the Farm Bill.  The reasons for this 
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coalition require further scrutiny, however, particularly in light of the 
generally adversarial relationship between the two sides described by Browne.  
What prompted the farm lobby to embrace the conservation provisions of the 
bill as opposed to, for example, simply seeking an expansion of existing 
commodity programs?  If the farm lobby was interested in bolstering farm 
income, a coalition with conservation interests would not be necessary per se, 
unless there were circumstances that made it so. 
It is worth noting that the farm lobby was not monolithic in its set of 
preferences for the Farm Bill.  Zulauf, Guither and Henderson (1987) found 
that agribusiness interests, with an eye toward more competitive prices on the 
world market, preferred a somewhat more laissez-faire policy stance with 
regard to commodity programs in general, while small farm operations 
favored, for example, focusing price and income support on farms generating 
less than $40,000 per year in sales, for obvious reasons; larger farm operations 
opposed this and prevailed.  Most relevant to this analysis, however, is that all 
three groups strongly favored the soil conservation provisions within the Farm 
Bill (pp.90-91).   
What was the motivation for agricultural interests advocating a 
conservation reserve program?  Leitch (1987) posited:  
[The 1985 Farm Bill] does include the Conservation Title, not as a 
primary purpose, but rather as a consolation to the environmental 
community.  Amidst growing public skepticism, and with an 
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administration ideologically committed to removing government from 
the marketplace, agricultural interests had little choice but to 
compromise and give environmentalists room to push their agendas 
(p.92).   
 
This gets closer to the underlying issue, particularly in acknowledging that 
conservation was not “a primary purpose” of the legislation, but if passage of 
the CRP constituted a “compromise” allowing environmentalists “room to 
push their agendas”, why then did farmers receive the most concentrated 
benefits from the program?  Neither Browne nor Leitch provided a satisfactory 
answer to this question.   
One alternative explanation is that, with the threats to agriculture’s 
ability to appropriate largesse described by Leitch, farm interests moved to 
expand the conflict by bringing environmentalists into the fray 
(Schattschnieder, 1960).  Moe (1991) stated that “political victory is 
exceedingly difficult in the absence of compromise with the losing side.  If the 
winners want to shift the status quo, they will usually have to let the losers 
participate” (p.125).  Baumgartner and Jones (1991) described three ways (or a 
combination of any of the three) in which this conflict expansion might occur.  
The first scenario described is that of an interest in a losing position that seeks 
to draw in additional players to gain visibility for the issue.  As discussed 
previously, this clearly does not apply to the agricultural lobby in this case; 
although threatened from multiple directions – most notably the rise of 
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environmentalism as a political force – agriculture was not in what could be 
characterized as a “losing” position at any point in the process.  The second 
scenario described by Baumgartner and Jones involves the entrance of 
“concerned outsiders”, which may themselves be proceeding from a position of 
weakness, seeking to ally with the losing faction in the subsystem.  Again, the 
“loser” characterization does not fit with the position of agriculture in this 
instance, and further, the environmental lobby was clearly not in a position of 
weakness.  Weakness on the part of the “outsiders” was not a presented by 
Baumgartner and Jones as a necessary condition, however.  The conservation 
lobby was clearly seeking to make inroads to the agriculture policy community 
(Browne, 1988), but this does nothing so far to explain the motivation of the 
agriculture lobby for embracing this expansion.  The final alternative 
described by Baumgartner and Jones is encroachment by policy-makers (i.e. 
legislators or bureaucrats) from other subsystems seeking to expand their 
domain.  The incursion here involved interests from other subsystems, rather 
than legislators or regulators, but the scenario is similar to a degree. 
The underlying shortcoming of these expansion-of-conflict scenarios is 
that they assume weakness on the part of the group whose policy domain is 
being encroached upon – in this case, the agricultural lobby.  As such, while 
farm interests were clearly accepting an expansion of conflict (as it were), they 
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were not doing so from a position of weakness, per se.  They were in a position 
of relative strength, and their behavior was aimed at preserving that strength.   
McCool (1990) described the concept of “cooptation through 
allocation”, by which a subsystem responds to potential conflicts, be it from 
within the ranks of the subsystem or from without, by consenting to part of 
what the conflicting interest wants in order to allow their own agenda to be 
passed.  Ripley and Franklin (1980) stated: 
A “smart” subgovernment – one intent on preserving its dominance 
without serious diminution – will adjust to potentially threatening 
developments ahead of time, perhaps by finding a way of defusing 
them… Continuing competition among several subgovernments can 
also stimulate one or more of them to make adjustments that will 
preserve their importance and dominant positions (p.120).   
 
Wildavsky (1979/1987) similarly said that “sectors try to internalize… external 
effects, so that whatever happens, they remain in charge” (p.70).  Moe (1991) 
described political uncertainty, i.e. who would be involved in (or in control of) 
the policy arena in the future, as it affects the structure of political institutions; 
an agency is organized so as to not only to achieve desired outcomes, but also 
for “insulating it from the [future] legitimate control of political enemies” 
(p.124).  This argument is here applied not to organizational design, but to 
policy formulation.   
 What is being described differs from Baumgartner and Jones (1991) in 
the sense that the inclusion of the environmental agenda was not so much a 
 91 
matter of concession to environmental interests as it was the expropriation of 
the language, i.e. the policy image per Baumgartner and Jones, of a 
conservation agenda to pass a program which was all along intended to 
provide income support for farmers.  In addition to acquiring income support 
for its members, the framing of the CRP as primarily conservation-oriented 
and the allowance for a policy that generates environmental benefits allowed 
the farm lobby to inoculate its subsystem against potential cooption by harder-
line environmental interests who may well have sought policies detrimental to 
the interests of the agricultural lobby’s membership.   
In a reversal of Browne’s (1988) analysis, the question of why the 
environmental lobby supported the CRP reemerges at this point.  As noted by 
Representative Marlenee of Montana, the CRP enjoyed essentially “unanimous 
support” (U.S. Congress, 1985, p.24582).  If the policy was mainly aimed at 
supplementing farm incomes, and if offsetting effects such as slippage were a 
potential problem (although little was said of this potential during the policy 
hearings, primarily since neither the agricultural nor environmental lobbies 
had any incentive to point out anything that would be contrary to the 
program being passed), then what purpose did environmental interests have in 
supporting this policy instead of seeking one which would have more directly 
brought about reductions in soil erosion?   
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This focuses the discussion back onto the concept of purpose in fact 
(Posner, 1971):  Are policies sometimes passed for reasons other than those 
explicitly stated by supporters and policymakers?  Judges often attempt to 
discern the true meaning or legislative intent of statutes when applying the 
law to cases brought before them.  In this context, judges are typically 
attempting to determine the meaning of specific words within the statute 
based upon the legislative history of the policy.  Corry (1936), however, 
argued that “intention of the legislature is a myth, and the only possible value 
of parliamentary reports and debates is to give clues to the social purpose 
which was the driving force behind the bill” (p.290).  This point is well-taken.  
It is the social circumstances surrounding formulation and adoption of the 
CRP, as has been discussed in earlier chapters, which lends context to 
statements made in support of it in determining its purpose in fact.29   
Stone (2002) pointed out that the stated purpose of a policy is not 
merely a statement of desired outcome, but a tool for gaining the support of 
key players in the policy community.  For this reason, Stone contended, stated 
policy goals are often vague in order to allow support to be drawn from actors 
who might conflict over a more defined set of goals (p.243).  Edelman (1971) 
____________________ 
 
29 Purpose in fact is similar to legislative intent insofar as it attempts to discern the meaning 
behind legislative action.  However, unlike legislative intent, purpose in fact does not 
necessarily speak to the manner in which the statute is to be interpreted vis-à-vis 
enforcement, only to the purpose it was intended to fulfill. 
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described the use of language in political situations to “intensify some 
perceptions and screen others out of attention” (p.66).  Edelman (1960; 1964) 
carried the argument further, claiming that policies very often “[promise] 
something substantially different from what was delivered” (p.697).   
Edelman contended that the public interests that policies claim to focus 
upon are in actuality often not addressed by the policy’s instruments.  The 
question Edelman addressed was why, once the relative ineffectiveness of a 
policy became apparent, offended interest groups did not lobby for changes or 
repeal – using Edelman’s terminology, why were they quiescent regarding 
ineffectual policies?  His response was that groups often favor not simply the 
substantive attributes of a policy, but they also value a policy’s symbolic value.  
Therefore, when faced with competing interests, policymakers often “give the 
rhetoric to one side and the decision to the other” (p.702).  In other words, the 
policy may include sufficient language to reassure the one interest that their 
concern is addressed by the policy, but it may well substantively favor the 
other, even to the point of offering protection to the group putatively being 
regulated.  Often, Edelman (1960) concluded, policies may contain both 
substantive and symbolic effects, with one of the two effects being dominant 
(p.703).   
In the case of the CRP, the language in the Act – the symbolic, or at 
least largely symbolic, aspect – is clearly aimed at environmental interests, but, 
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as has been demonstrated in the preceding sections, the substance of the Act, 
and its apparent intent, is directed at benefiting farmers, the group that it 
ostensibly regulates.   
Why might the conservation lobby go along with this?  Svendsen 
(1999) found environmental lobbies and electricity producers on the same side 
in favor of a hypothetical grandfathered tradable CO2 permit regime.  
Electricity producers favored permits because there was no charge to firms for 
the initial distribution of permits and because they provide a barrier against 
new entrants (only existing firms received emission permits – new entrants 
would be excluded, thus creating a substantial cost barrier); environmental 
groups, although initially objecting to marketable permits because they 
essentially “legitimized” a level of pollution, came to support permits because 
they must achieve results in order to maintain financial support from 
contributors, and cooperation with the electricity producer lobby was the 
most likely means to accomplish this goal even if the policy advocated did not 
generate the preferred level of abatement (p.119).  In the case of the CRP, the 
conservation lobby found itself in the position of potentially going up against 
the farm lobby, whose influence in this arena had been entrenched for over 
half a century.  Conservationists found themselves better served to cooperate 
with the farm lobby in order to achieve the level of soil conservation resulting 
from the program (though not insubstantial, as previously discussed; see 
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Newman, 1988) and a large symbolic victory than to treat the process as a 
zero-sum game (Moe, 1991) and pursue strict regulation of farm operators, 
which the still-powerful farm lobby would certainly oppose.  One risk of an 
all-or-nothing approach is the very real possibility of ending up with nothing.  
Coming away with nothing was hardly an attractive option.  Taking a 
cooperative approach was for conservationists therefore purely rational.   
 
Conclusion – Preemptive Policymaking 
Although the agricultural policy arena had become much more 
competitive than it had been when McConnell (1953) and Lowi (1969) 
described it as a veritable fiefdom for the agricultural lobby, the farm lobby’s 
influence remained very substantial in the first half of the 1980s.  However, 
the farm lobby was forward-looking enough to recognize a threefold threat to 
their income support programs:  The Reagan administration had articulated a 
philosophy of reducing government involvement in the market, which 
included retrenchment on agricultural commodity programs; public opinion 
had been moving strongly in favor of conservation since the 1970s were 
declared “the decade of the environment” (CQ, 1970, p.488), and conservation 
had become a viable campaign issue; finally, armed with this swell in public 
support, the environmental lobby had entered the previously monopolized 
agricultural policy arena.  Sabatier (1988) indicated that such changes in the 
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policy environment can be expected to elicit a strategic response on the part of 
the threatened subsystem. 
 In light of this, a theory of the motivation of the behavior of the players 
within the agricultural policy subgovernment can be formulated.  The farm 
lobby, which had dominated its policy arena for much of the twentieth 
century, was faced with incursion by conservation interests.  The risk was that 
this newcomer would push for policies that would work contrary to the 
interests of farm operators, in the form of negative inducements.  The farm 
lobby therefore chose to engage in preemptive policymaking behavior.   
 In medicine, practitioners inoculate patients against disease by injecting 
them with weakened or killed viruses in order to stimulate the body’s natural 
resistance to the contagion.  In policy, subsystems likewise may choose to 
inoculate themselves against incursion by “infectious” external agents by 
enacting policies that give, in Edelman’s (1960) terms, a largely symbolic 
victory to the new entrants, while retaining the substantive policy effects for 
themselves.  By so doing, potentially damaging conflict can be avoided 
through mollification.  This goes a step further than previous studies such as 
McCool’s (1990) “cooption through allocation”, in that it steps beyond 
pragmatic compromise to recognition that the use of the policy image, thus 
creating symbolic policy, may be sufficient to disarm such a threat.  Ripley and 
Franklin (1980) stated that “successful” challenges to a dominant 
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subgovernment may “force marginal adjustments that still preserve the 
substance of policy and the reality of subgovernment dominance” (p.120).  
Ripley and Franklin give as an example the adaptation of the tobacco 
subsystem to “relatively mild” smoking regulations (pp.106, 120; see also 
Fritschler & Hoefler, 1996).  However, although Ripley and Franklin describe 
a very similar phenomenon insofar as they characterize gains made by the 
anti-smoking movement as “largely symbolic”, the thrust of preemptive 
policymaking is that it allows the dominant subsystem to acquire benefits to 
itself, not simply to minimize costs of onerous regulation, as was the case with 
anti-smoking policy.   
Symbolism can be used by subgovernments to disarm possible threats 
from other subsystems while securing additional benefits for themselves.  In 
politics, rhetoric is a powerful tool for advancing an agenda (Stone, 2002; 
Edelman, 1971).  To illustrate, assume two subsystems: Alpha, a subsystem 
currently dominating a particular policy arena, and Beta, a subsystem that 
seeks to challenge Alpha’s dominance.  Alpha may be able to decrease the 
threat posed by Beta by cutting away at Beta’s ability to frame the policy 
agenda to its own advantage.  It can do this by robbing Beta of its rhetoric.  In 
other words, it is to Alpha’s advantage to expropriate Beta’s rhetoric and adopt 
it for its own policy agenda in order to portray itself as already-friendly to 
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Beta’s cause, leaving Beta no grounds for attack.  This is what is meant by 
preemptive policymaking. 
 In the case of the CRP, the farm lobby preemptively advocated what it 
characterized as conservation policy and used it to supplement existing income 
support programs, thereby disarming the potential threat of onerous regulation 
in the 1985 Farm Bill by allowing the conservation lobby to score in effect a 
rhetorical victory.  On the other side of this would-be battle, the 
environmental lobby, when faced with the risk of failure in achieving its goals 
in a new arena already dominated by an entrenched farm lobby, chose 
cooperation over conflict.  Any weaknesses that might have existed in the 
proposed program, such as offsetting effects like slippage, were certainly not in 
the interest of either farmers or conservationists to point out.  A breakdown of 
this détente would likely have resulted in open battle, leaving the 
conservationist lobby with the risk of leaving empty-handed and the farm 
lobby with the possible diminution of farm income support due to pressure 
from the White House and costly regulation due to pressure from the 
environmental lobby.  At any rate, the farm lobby was successful at securing a 
policy to advance its own interests and effectively placating the environmental 
lobby.   
 As a final consideration, in addition to the CRP, the Conservation Title 
of the Farm Bill contained three other provisions: Conservation Compliance, 
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Sodbuster and Swampbuster.  These programs, as discussed earlier, prevented 
payment of benefits for commodity programs to farmers who did not conform 
to certain conservation practices.  Chapman (1988) referred to the CRP as “the 
carrot” and to these three ancillary programs as “the stick” (p.13).  While the 
CRP is considered in this study separately from these programs, the potential 
environmental benefits of these programs is evident and warrants 
consideration.  Given the policy environment described in this chapter, these 
programs can be seen as the use of the issue of soil conservation to shield 
existing commodity programs from cuts to which they might otherwise be 
vulnerable.  This kind of strategic behavior would not be inconsistent with the 
behavior described in this section. 
 
 100 
  
CHAPTER 6 
 
SLIPPAGE DEFINED AND DETECTED 
 
 
 Policy, in the methods it employs to achieve its stated objective, often 
generates unintended consequences.  Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) pointed 
out that “[t]here is no mode of organizing social life not subject to… 
unanticipated consequences” (p.xviii).  Peltzman (1975) famously illustrated 
this phenomenon using the example of regulations requiring the production of 
automobiles with safety features such as seatbelts and impact-absorbing 
steering columns.  Peltzman demonstrated that data indicated no net effect of 
these safety regulations on the rate of highway deaths; this occurred, he 
contended, because as safety measures decreased the risk of death from vehicle 
accidents, drivers were inclined to engage in riskier behavior, in effect 
offsetting the effects of the safety regulation.30  Conservation programs are 
likewise susceptible to unintended offsetting behavior.  Burtraw, Palmer and 
Krupnick (1997), for example, discussed potential unintended effects of certain 
policies used by regulators to reflect social costs in technological investment 
____________________ 
 
30 It should be noted that Crandall and Graham (1984) found that offsetting behavioral effects 
are small relative to the technical benefits offered by automobile safety devices. 
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choices of electrical utilities.  The authors pointed out that the policy may 
cause the utilities to use technologies that are more environmentally friendly 
but less cost effective, resulting in higher prices to energy consumers.  These 
higher energy prices may cause residential consumers to use alternative heat 
sources, such as wood, that are ultimately even more environmentally 
unfriendly (p.225).  Kwoka (1983) showed that provisions in the Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards on automobiles allowing 
manufacturers to meet the standards by changing the mix of cars sold (i.e. 
selling more fuel-efficient cars and fewer “gas guzzlers”) could in actuality 
increase the amount of fuel consumed if the demand for fuel-efficient cars is 
more elastic than that of larger, less fuel-efficient models; this would result in 
a net increase in automobile sales and, presumably, an increase in miles 
traveled, thus offsetting, potentially in toto, the fuel savings intended by the 
CAFE standards (p.696).  Kleit (2002) argued a similar effect due to the lower 
per-mile cost of driving more fuel efficient automobiles; he predicted that 
overall miles driven would increase as a result of CAFE standards, the 
emissions from which would partially offset the program’s goals. 
 Such unanticipated consequences largely result from one of three 
factors (Merton, 1936).  Firstly, they occur due to the state of knowledge 
regarding the full range of possible outcomes from policy instruments; 
unanticipated consequences in this case are just that.  They come about from 
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effects on the environment not foreseen by the policy’s framers.  The second 
factor is error on the part of policymakers in anticipating all possible 
outcomes; this factor occurs not due to ignorance, but simply from a failure to 
take into account all available information.  Finally, unanticipated outcomes 
can occur due to a bias on the part of policymakers toward short run returns 
over long run consequences.   While it is the goal of this chapter in particular 
to provide illumination regarding the first factor, if the thesis of this study – 
that the CRP was passed for purposes other than for soil conservation – is 
correct, the final factor will be the more likely explanation for the presence of 
the alleged slippage in the program, insofar as alleviating economic hardship in 
the agricultural sector in the short run was a more immediate problem than 
that of the long run preservation of natural resources. 
Reserve programs like the CRP and others past and present were 
implemented with one of the following stated goals: to reduce the acreage 
farmed (for environmental purposes), to reduce the quantity of crops produced 
(in order to reduce crop surpluses, with the ultimate effect of exerting upward 
pressure on the market price), or to achieve both of these goals.  These goals, 
however, can be upset by unintended effects such as slippage.  Generally 
speaking, slippage is said to have occurred when the resulting decrease in 
either the number of acres in production or the quantity of crops produced is 
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partly or wholly offset by some behavior stemming from unintended 
incentives created by the program (see Love & Foster, 1990, p.272).   
 Roberts and Bucholtz (2002) defined four types of slippage (p.2).  “Type 
1” slippage occurs when land retired under the program is low-yield; if the 
goal of the program in question is to reduce the level of commodity 
production, the removal of this low-yield land will not reduce output by the 
amount it would if land of average productivity were retired; Hoag, Babcock 
and Foster (1993) referred to this as “land-quality slippage” (p.182; see also 
Benbrook, 1979; 1980).  This type of behavior by farmers is rational, given the 
option of receiving rental payments on land that is not productive versus 
receiving payment for land that is income-generating.  If possible, one would 
expect the landowner to choose to enroll the less productive land so long as 
the rental payment was greater than the income generated from cropping that 
land.  This would, however, reduce the effectiveness of the program in terms 
of reducing crop production.   
The second type of slippage [“Type 2”] results from increased use of 
resources on non-enrolled land, thus increasing its productivity and offsetting 
reductions in crop production resulting from the retirement of the program 
land (Grant, 1979; Love & Foster, 1990; Hrubovcak, LeBlanc & Miranowski, 
1990).   
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 These first two types of slippage are those more commonly examined in 
the literature.  Gardner (1987b) estimated the percentage of crop output 
reductions lost to slippage by multiplying the percent decrease in planted 
acreage by a slippage coefficient:  
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Gardner stated that the common level of slippage in commodity reduction 
programs is around thirty-five percent (p.60).  Love and Foster (1990) defined 
slippage algebraically as  
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with Y representing total aggregate yield per acre and Π the ratio of planted 
land to total land (p.272).  They estimated slippage for wheat to be between 29 
and 37 percent, for corn between 48 and 58 percent, and for soybeans (as a 
result of the reductions in corn production, as soybeans are a substitute for 
corn in terms of land use) between 30 and 38 percent (pp.279-80).  Hoag, 
Babcock and Foster (1993), in a study of corn farms in North Carolina, 
estimated farm-level slippage rates to be lower than the national aggregate 
rates found by Love and Foster (1990), which they attributed to low land 
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quality variability within individual farms relative to land quality variability 
that may be observed between farms.   
 Fewer studies have been done on the last two types of slippage, which 
shall be the topic of this current study.  These types were defined as the 
activation of previously uncultivated land [“Type 3”] and activation of land 
that would otherwise be left fallow due to crop rotation [“Type 4”] (Roberts & 
Bucholtz, 2002).  These two forms of slippage are difficult to distinguish 
between when measuring, and both tend to arise from the same causes, so 
Type 3 and Type 4 slippage were studied jointly in the articles that shall be 
discussed shortly, as well as in this current study.  For purposes of this study, 
Type 3 and Type 4 slippage shall be referred to collectively as land-loss 
slippage (LLS).  LLS can in general terms be said to exist, ceteris paribus, if: 
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where ACt is the total acres planted of crop C in time “t”, and RCt is the number 
of C base acres retired under the program in time “t”.   
 LLS can result through two possible mechanisms.  The first is the 
substitution of new or previously fallow land by individual farmers for land 
idled under the CRP.  Wu (2000) explained that farms will contain land of 
variable productivity; the most productive land will be devoted to crop 
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production, while less productive land will be split between cropping and 
non-cropping uses, such as grazing, rangeland and forestry, depending upon 
the relative profitability of each usage.  Assuming that the marginal profit of 
both activities is diminishing with respect to the amount of land used (which 
is a reasonable assumption so long as there are some resources that are fixed), 
when some of the less productive land being used for crop production is idled 
under the CRP, the marginal profitability of cropping increases, providing an 
incentive for farmers to shift some of the land currently used for non-cropping 
activity to cropping (p.982).   
 Wu (2000) used regression analysis to compare county-level land usage 
in the Northern Midwest United States in the years 1982, before the CRP was 
initiated, and 1992.  Wu found that, holding other parameters constant, there 
was an increase in cropland between the two years; slippage rates were 
estimated to range from 15 percent in some states in the region to 30 percent 
(p.986).  Wu also found that the more acres that are enrolled in the program in 
a given county, the more likely LLS is to take place.  Wu estimated significant 
reductions in the environmental benefits from retiring CRP land as a result of 
LLS.    
 USDA Economic Research Service (ERS) economists Roberts and 
Bucholtz (2002, 2005) attributed Wu’s findings to “spurious correlation” due to 
the omission of land quality as a variable, which is a factor that is expected to 
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affect land use, as well as the number of acres enrolled in the CRP.  They 
argued that this created a missing-variable bias in Wu’s regression.  Roberts 
and Bucholtz tested this theory by “reversing” Wu’s model, regressing land 
converted from cropping to non-cropping usage.  The results of this model 
indicated a twelve percent increase, i.e., negative slippage, in non-cropped 
land over the study period, which they contended proves that Wu’s findings 
were biased (Roberts & Bucholtz, 2005, pp.246-247).  Roberts and Bucholtz 
additionally used a two-stage least square model in which CRP enrollment was 
instrumented and regressed on the proportion of land classified as highly 
erodible within each crop district, and in which the second stage regression 
was weighted to deal with heteroskedasticity due to sampling errors.  Different 
permutations of these models returned varying estimates of slippage ranging 
between 2 and 19 percent.  As before, they also constructed a model with 
cropland converted to non-cropping use as a check of specification; this model 
returned an estimate of negative slippage of 8 percent.  These “ambiguous” 
results led the authors to submit that there is “no convincing evidence” of LLS 
due to substitution in the CRP (pp.249-250).   
 Wu (2005) argued that instrumenting CRP enrollment was unnecessary 
because, while farmers may base their decision to enroll land in the program 
partly on land quality, the overall level of enrollment within a given area is 
determined not by farmers but by program administrators.  As such, the CRP 
 109 
enrollment variable was exogenous to his land use model (p.253).  Wu further 
countered that the models run by Roberts and Bucholtz (2005), while 
ambiguous in terms of the degree of slippage present, did in fact indicate that 
LLS due to substitution is present, thus verifying rather than refuting Wu 
(2000).  Intuitively, however, this form of LLS is rational so long as farmers 
can increase profits by replacing productivity lost to CRP land; farmers can 
thereby continue to receive the same, or nearly the same, level of income from 
commodity production while nonetheless receiving rental payments on retired 
land.31   
 The second mechanism through which LLS may occur is price feedback 
effects.  This type of LLS has received no empirical study.  Price feedback 
refers to a general equilibrium phenomenon in which price changes in a 
commodity or resource generate in essence a causal loop, resulting in a 
reciprocal, offsetting effect.  For instance, Vietorisz and Harrison (1973) gave 
the example of feedback in the labor market wherein an exogenous increase in 
wage rates may result in producers ultimately shifting to more capital-
intensive production processes resulting in a decrease in labor demand, thus 
bringing wage rates back down, possibly returning to the original equilibrium, 
____________________ 
 
31 Testifying before the House Subcommittee on Conservation, Credit and Rural Development 
in 1988, the National Audubon Society expressed concern that this type of behavior required 
“priority attention” (U.S. House, 1988, p.325). 
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depending on the strength of the feedback effect; this phenomenon is referred 
to as negative feedback.  Also possible is a positive feedback effect wherein the 
same exogenous increase in wages may lead to the adoption of labor-saving 
innovation, thus increasing worker productivity, increasing the demand for 
labor and driving wage rates further up.  In this study, the focus shall be on 
negative feedback. 
 The price feedback effect concerning the CRP and agricultural 
production is hypothesized to be the following (for purposes of this 
illustration, assume a competitive market for wheat):  A given number of 
wheat base acres is retired from production under the CRP, thereby reducing 
the supply of wheat by the amount WW RY × , where WY  is average yield of the 
retired land in terms of bushels of wheat per acre (assuming for simplicity that 
all of the retired land had been in production prior to enrollment).  This 
decrease in the market supply will raise the price of wheat faced by farms 
across the entire industry.  If farm operators are profit maximizers, each farm 
in the market will increase its production in order to take advantage of above-
normal profits.  This increase in production, it is predicted, will involve the 
activation of fallow or previously uncultivated land; this activation of new 
land to replace that retired under the program is what is being referred to as 
price-feedback land loss slippage.  The increase in demand for land may result 
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in a temporary increase in agricultural land values (Shoemaker, 1989).  The 
long-term effect of LLS will be to increase the market supply of wheat as new 
land is activated, creating offsetting downward pressure on the price faced by 
farmers.32  As such, LLS, of both varieties, holds implications not only for 
environmental goals, but for any surplus reduction goals as well.   
 
The Model 
 As the form of LLS for which this study is testing is that resulting from 
price feedback effects, the offset in acres planted can be expected to come 
about by way of an increase in the price of wheat resulting in turn from the 
removal of land from production through enrollment in the program.  The 
commodity wheat was chosen because it is a very widely grown commodity, 
grown in nearly every region of the country, and it requires relatively little 
special land preparation.  For example, slippage is less likely to exist for a 
commodity such as rice, as that crop requires special land conditions (such as 
flooding of fields) to be grown, thus making the amount of uncultivated land 
suitable for activation much lower, and the cost of new land preparation much 
higher.   
____________________ 
 
32 Interestingly, LLS resulting from substitution effects may have an offsetting effect on price 
feedback effects, depending on how quickly new land is activated to replace retired land.  The 
greater the extent to which farmers activate new land to replace that retired under the CRP, 
the less the market supply will decrease. 
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The model used to detect LLS is a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regression in which the price of wheat is the instrumented variable.  This 
design is used in order that the effects of CRP enrollment on the price of the 
commodity can be estimated in the first stage, and the effect of this change in 
price on the number of acres planted in wheat can then be estimated in the 
second stage.   
 
First Stage Equation 
The price of wheat (P) is determined by both demand and supply 
effects: 
 
ddqixd QP εγγ ++Χ= ,                                        (Eq.4a) 
 
sSqiZS QP εαα ++Ζ= ,                                        (Eq.4b) 
 
 
where Qd is quantity demanded, QS is quantity supplied, and Χi and Ζi are 
vectors of determinants for demand and supply, respectively, for observation 
“i”.  Assuming that the market is in equilibrium, Qd = Qs and Pd = PS.  The 
demand and supply equations are therefore set equal and solved for Q: 
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The solution for Q is next substituted into the demand-side equation for P: 
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Finally, assuming that εd and εs are independently, identically distributed with 
mean zero, the reduced-form equation for price is as follows: 
 
iiP Ζ+Χ= αγ ββ ,                                               (Eq.7) 
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 In the above reduced-form equation, the demand-side variables are I, 
which is per capita personal income, E, which is the state’s share in national 
wheat exports, F, total foreign exports, and O, Y, C, and B, the price of oats, 
rye, corn and barley, respectively.  The supply-side variable included is R, 
enrollment in the CRP.  Further discussion of each of these variables will 
follow. 
 
Second Stage Equation 
 In order to detect LLS from price feedback effects, the second stage 
model examines the effect of the price of wheat on the number of acres 
planted in wheat (A).  As the number of acres planted is a production decision, 
the relationship between the quantity of wheat produced (QS) and acres 
planted is: 
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sSpjAjHs PAQ εααα +++Η= ,                                    (Eq.8) 
 
 
where Hj is a vector of the determinants of supply for observation “j”, 
excluding A and Ps.  Solving for Aj yields: 
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Again assuming that εs is independently, identically distributed with mean 
zero, the reduced form for the second stage equation is therefore: 
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 The variables included in vector H are the target price for wheat set by 
the USDA (T) and D1 and D2, which are dummy variables that correspond to 
the Beale Code, an index of the level of county urbanization.  Again, these 
variables shall be discussed in more detail in the following section. 
 
Regressions 
Using the above equations, the models used to detect LLS are: 
 
Stage 1:  ( )itititittitittit BCYOFEIRfP ,,,,,,,= , and                (Eq.11a) 
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Stage 2:  ( )iitititit DDTQPgA 2,1,,,ˆ= ,                          (Eq.11b) 
 
 
for panel “i” and time “t”.  The models use panel data from all counties within 
the contiguous United States that showed wheat production in any year 
between 1980 and 1993.  The use of panel data allows for the observation of 
effects over several time periods and across a wide cross section, giving an 
abundance of data points in which the effects may be observed.  The model is 
an interrupted time series, beginning six years prior to treatment, i.e. the 
implementation of the program, in order to capture any unrelated trends in 
agricultural production that may have occurred during the study period that 
may otherwise manifest as spurious correlation.  The period 1986 through 
1993 represents the first twelve sign-ups for the program, data included in ERS 
Statistical Bulletin 925.   
The market price of wheat (P) is instrumented in order to test the effect 
of CRP enrollment on the variable.  Wheat price is then included in the 
second stage equation as a regressor to provide the link between land use and 
price feedback slippage.  The price used is the marketing year average (MYA), 
or the average market price of the commodity over the course of the current 
year.  Wheat price is therefore lagged one year in the second stage regression 
due to the necessity for farmers to base their planting decisions on the past 
year’s market price, as the current year price is based on market conditions, 
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such as production and demand, which are not observable at the time of 
planting.33  Wheat price is available only at the state level; in cases where no 
state price for wheat is available in a given year, which would be a year in 
which no counties within that state planted wheat, the national average price 
of wheat is used.  This variable is predicted to have a positive coefficient in the 
second stage regression, assuming a positively-sloped supply curve.  Wheat 
price data as well as other commodity price data in this model were obtained 
from the National Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS).34   
 Acres enrolled in the CRP in each year (R) is included as a regressor in 
the first stage equation in order to ascertain what, if any, effect the variable 
exerts on the price of wheat.  If the number of acres enrolled in the CRP 
significantly decreases wheat supply, the coefficient for CRP enrollment can 
be expected to be positive and significant, as an increase in enrollment would 
decrease supply which would increase the market price for the commodity.  
Combining this with the expected positive impact of the price of wheat on 
____________________ 
 
33 Agricultural commodities are predicted by Ezekiel (1938) and Waugh (1964), for example, to 
follow a “cobweb” pattern in which production in period “t” is determined by the commodity 
price in period “t-1”, while the price in period “t” is determined by production in the current 
period. 
34 All dollar amounts were discounted for inflation using the Chain-Type Price Index, 
1996=100. 
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acreage planted will indicate the level of price feedback slippage in the 
program. 
CRP data were aggregated at the national level in each year in order to 
account for the effect of removing program acreage from production on the 
market as a whole.  Using county-level data to search for LLS due to price-
feedback effects would miss the effect on local production resulting from 
changes in CRP enrollment occurring in other counties or regions of the 
country.  For example, land retired in Cheyenne County, Nebraska will have a 
market price effect on crops produced in Dawson County, Montana.  As such, 
failure to use cumulative data from program land retirement in all affected 
counties will not detect price feedback effects (see Roberts & Bucholtz, 2005; 
Wu, 2005).  CRP enrollment data in this study focus on wheat base acres 
retired.  Wheat base refers to land that was designated by the enrolling 
landowner as either having been used for the cultivation of wheat, or that 
allegedly would have been used for wheat cropping.  There is no indication 
from USDA data of any significant contract expirations or early opt-outs by 
landowners during this period, so that this enrollment data can be assumed to 
be a faithful measure of the number of acres of wheat-producing land that was 
retired in each year under the program.  CRP enrollment was lagged one year 
behind the wheat price variable, since land enrolled in the program in one 
year may not actually be removed from production until the following year. 
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State share of exports in metric tons (E) is the second regressor in the 
first stage equation.  Using export data gathered by the Customs Service, ERS 
estimates the value of each state’s exports of wheat based upon the total value 
of wheat exported by the United States divided proportionally by each state’s 
contribution to total national production.  These data are only available from 
ERS stated in dollars.  However, in order to avoid possible interaction between 
this variable and the dependent variable, this statistic was calculated 
independently using state-level NASS production data for wheat and total US 
wheat exports from the FATUS database.35  The coefficient for this variable is 
expected to be positive, as exports constitute a substantial portion of the 
demand faced by wheat farmers.  According to ERS statistics, nearly half of 
United States wheat produced is exported (ERS, 2006).  An increase in exports 
is therefore seen as representing an increase in demand for wheat, producing 
upward pressure on the price of the commodity.   
Total foreign exports (F) was obtained from ERS Agricultural Economic 
Report Number 712.  As wheat exported from foreign countries competes with 
U.S.-produced wheat in the world market, a negative correlation with the 
price of wheat is predicted. 
____________________ 
 
35 “Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States”, published by USDA Foreign Agricultural 
Service.  Data used is annual world total exports of unmilled wheat, wheat flour and other 
wheat products in metric tons. 
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State per capita personal income (I) as reported by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis is also used to explain P.  USDA data (ERS, 2003a) show 
that the income elasticity of bread and cereal food types for the United States 
is about 0.05, which indicates that grains are a normal good, albeit relatively 
inelastic.  The coefficient for this variable is predicted to be positive, but small. 
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Figure 1.  Real Commodity Prices (U.S. Average) 
 
 
Prices of other commodities are included in the model in order to 
control for cross-price effects.  These substitute commodities are oats (O), rye 
(Y), corn (C) and barley (B).  The coefficient for these variables is expected to 
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be positive, as increases in the market price for these commodities relative to 
wheat will tend to increase demand for wheat.  The historical trend of wheat 
prices and the substitute commodity prices is shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 2.  Total Wheat-base Acres Enrolled and Acres Planted in Wheat (U.S. Total) 
 
 
 
The dependent variable in the second stage regression is total acres 
planted in wheat (A) in county “i” and year “t”.  Cropping data for each county 
were obtained from NASS.  The model, in order to isolate price effects within 
commodities, deals strictly with acres planted with wheat.  Total acres planted 
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in wheat and total CRP enrollment of wheat base acres are presented in Figure 
2.  
The first independent variable in the second stage regression is 
production (Q), the amount of wheat harvested in the previous year in each 
county.  This variable is included in order to control for land productivity in 
previous years.  This is expected to have a positive effect on acres planted if 
land is allocated to its most highly valued use; farming operations will tend to 
favor counties with more productive land and cultivate proportionally less 
land in counties that have less productive land.  The variable Q also controls 
indirectly for the geographical county size, given that, ceteris paribus, a larger 
county will have more land that can be devoted to crop production. 
The target price for wheat (T) is included in order to control for effects 
on production resulting from price supports.  In each year, the USDA sets 
minimum per bushel target prices for commodities; if the national average 
market price received by farmers does not meet the target price, the USDA 
issues deficiency payments to farmers to make up the difference.  Intuitively, 
the coefficient on target price is expected to be positive, as farmers can be 
expected to respond to a higher target price in the same manner as they would 
respond to higher market prices (as assumed by Choi & Johnson, 1993); 
however, the presence of the 0/92 program complicates the matter.  This will 
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be further discussed in the presentation of results.  Target prices used in this 
study are reported in ERS Agricultural Economic Report Number 712. 
The model controls for county urbanization using the Beale Code, an 
index of urbanization that can take a value between zero (the most urbanized 
counties) and nine (the most rural counties) as compiled by ERS.36  Two 
dummy variables (D1 and D2) are used to indicate the Beale classification for 
each county.  D1 is set equal to “1” if the county’s Beale Code was 0 to 3, 
which denotes counties of varying population (0 denoting counties with the 
largest population) that lie within statistical metropolitan areas.37  D2 is set 
equal to “1” if the county Beale Code was 4, indicating a county with a 
population of 20,000 or more located adjacent to a metropolitan area.  These 
variables are included in order to capture the opportunity cost associated with 
cultivating land in areas in which agricultural land is also in demand for 
development.  In more urbanized counties, this land is likely to have a higher 
alternative use value than in rural counties.38  The Beale Codes are compiled  
____________________ 
 
36 These data were obtained from ERS (2003b). 
37 A statistical metropolitan area is defined by the Office of Management and Budget as a 
county or group of counties containing a central urban area with a population of at least 
50,000 persons, including any adjacent counties that are economically or socially tied to the 
central urban area. 
38 Beale Code values 5 through 9 indicate counties that either are not adjacent to metropolitan 
areas, or are of a smaller population, which would tend to suggest lower demand for land for 
development.   
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Table 4.   
Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Dev. Min Max 
 
Acres planted in wheat  
per county 
 
A 
 
27,878.53 
 
59,981.51 
 
0 
 
764,400 
 
Price of Wheat (1996 
dollars) 
 
P 
 
4.45 
 
0.93 
 
2.26 
 
8.53 
 
Wheat Base Acres Enrolled 
in CRP (nationally, zeroes 
excluded)  
 
R 
 
7,842,735.25 
 
3,483,665.14 
 
554,256 
 
10,833,470 
 
Production (bushels) 
 
Q 
 
623,830.70 
 
1,656,531 
 
0 
 
33,900,000 
 
State Exports (metric tons) 
 
E 
 
1,078,670 
 
1,332,043 
 
3,707.11 
 
7,480,416 
 
Total Foreign Exports   
(millions of bushels) 
 
F 
 
2,780.93 
 
355.10 
 
2,047 
 
3,248 
 
State Per Capita Personal 
Income (1996 dollars) 
 
I 
 
17,170.33 
 
3,790.57 
 
4,504.09 
 
52,003.32 
 
Price of Oats (1996 dollars) 
 
O 
 
2.33 
 
0.63 
 
1.06 
 
6.01 
 
Price of Rye (1996 dollars) 
 
Y 
 
3.31 
 
0.90 
 
1.13 
 
7.40 
 
Price of Corn (1996 
dollars) 
 
C 
 
3.62 
 
0.87 
 
1.55 
 
7.49 
 
Price of Barley (1996 
dollars) 
 
B 
 
3.04 
 
0.72 
 
1.30 
 
6.49 
 
Target Price of Wheat 
(1996 dollars) 
 
T 
 
5.76 
 
0.78 
 
4.53 
 
6.71 
 
Number of Counties (i) 
 
2,681 
   
Time Periods (t) 14    
Total Observations 37,534    
Time Periods (t) – with lags 12    
Total Observations – with lags 32,172    
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every ten years, so that the data are only available for two years – 1983 and 
1993 – of the study period, although data for a number of counties are not 
available for 1983.  The values for 1993 are used because counties that were 
urbanized at the end of the study period would likely experience increasing 
demand for land for development during the study period.   
 
Results 
 Using the Likelihood Ratio test, the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity was not rejected for the first stage variables, but it was 
rejected for the second stage.  Heteroskedasticity in the second stage is possibly 
arising from sampling error in the NASS data; although the data are inclusive, 
there are likely to be some sampling errors at the county level due to 
aggregation of the data, rather than maintaining inventories of individual plots 
of land (Roberts & Bucholtz, 2002).  These errors will likely tend to vary with 
size and the amount of agricultural activity within each county (Roberts & 
Bucholtz, 2005).39  Autocorrelation was also detected using the Wooldridge 
test for autocorrelation in panel data.  As such, the model was run using 
heteroskedastic and autocorrelation (HAC) robust standard errors using  
____________________ 
 
39 Note that Roberts and Bucholtz (2005) discussed this problem as regarding the National 
Resources Inventory, which is a less exhaustive inventory than the NASS data.  It is 
reasonable, however, to extend the caveat to the NASS. 
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Table 5.   
Model I Results 
 First Stage Second Stage 
  P (instrumented) 
(z statistic) 
Centered R2 = .7222 
A 
(z statistic) 
Centered R2 = .5675 
CRP Enrollment 
(lagged) 
2.38x10-8 
(22.36***) 
 
Share of Exports 
 
6.06x10-8 
(28.54***) 
 
Foreign Exports -3.69x10-4 
(-25.48***) 
 
Per Capita Personal 
Income 
5.50x10-6 
(7.23***) 
 
Price of Oats 
 
0.2384 
(36.48***) 
 
Price of Rye 
 
4.95x10-2 
(11.68***) 
 
Price of Corn 
 
0.3502 
(66.53***) 
 
Price of Barley 
 
0.4824 
(57.00***) 
 
Price of Wheat 
(lagged) 
 1,040.920 
(5.95***) 
Quantity Produced 
(lagged) 
 3.11x10-2 
(76.69***) 
Target Price  -6,022.492 
(-17.14***) 
Beale = 0 to 3  -4,946.058 
(-10.84***) 
Beale = 4  -6,849.359 
(-5.66***) 
Intercept 
 
1.766 
(39.48***) 
33,374.760 
(16.42***) 
 
 n = 2,681 
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Huber/White/sandwich and kernel-based estimators.40  In addition, the model 
was run using general method of moments which tends to yield consistent 
estimators regardless of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Vogelsang, 
2001). 
 Three models were run with the data.  Model I utilizes the entire 
dataset.  Model II was run excluding the bottom ten percent of counties 
according to average number of acres planted in wheat across the study period.  
These counties are excluded in Model II in order to test the robustness of the 
results with more perennial wheat-producing counties.  Model III was run 
with only the top ten percent wheat producing counties.41     
 
Model I 
The results of Model I are presented in Table 4.  All of the coefficients 
in the two-stage model have the expected signs except for target price (T), 
which will be discussed in the following paragraph.  The coefficient of the 
price of wheat is positive and significant in the second stage regression.  In the 
first stage regression, the coefficient for acres enrolled nationally in the CRP is 
____________________ 
 
40 This was done using the “robust” and “bw(#)” options in conjunction with the “ivreg2” 
command in Intercooled Stata 8.0. 
41 These top-producer counties were located in Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas and Washington. 
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positive and significant, indicating that increasing the number of acres in the 
program exerts upward pressure on the price according to predictions 
discussed earlier.  The coefficient for CRP enrollment is understandably small, 
given that the model reflects marginal changes.  In other words, increasing 
program enrollment by one acre will have a minuscule impact on the market 
price at the state or national level simply due to magnitude.  However, as 
program enrollment increases more, the effect on price will naturally be 
proportionally larger.  For example, national wheat-base CRP enrollment 
increased by approximately 3.6 million acres in fiscal year 1987.  According to 
the model, such an increase in program enrollment can be expected to result 
in a 9 cent increase in wheat price, all else equal.   
The seemingly counter-intuitive sign on the coefficient for target price 
is in itself an interesting finding, as the magnitude and significance level of the 
coefficient for target price exceeds that of lagged wheat price.  As alluded to in 
the previous section, it can be explained by the presence of the 0/92 program.  
This provision was a voluntary acreage diversion program which allowed 
farmers to plant between zero and 92 percent of their allotted acres in wheat 
and continue to receive up to 92 percent of the applicable deficiency payments 
on the uncultivated land, so long as conservation measures were carried out on 
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the diverted land, or if planted in approved non-program crops.42  This being 
the case, the greater the amount by which the target price was anticipated to 
exceed the market price in a given cropping year, the greater the incentive for 
farmers to divert land from production.43   
 As discussed in the previous section, slippage can be estimated by 
combining the preceding results with those for the price of wheat in the 
second stage regression, as the CRP enrollment variable is endogenous.  Based 
on the definition for slippage given in Equation 3, percent of price-feedback 
LLS can be estimated by directly measuring the price-feedback effect at the 
county level, as follows: 
 
RPR
P
P
A
R
A ββδ
δ
δ
δ
δ
δ
=⋅= .                                          (Eq.12) 
 
 
Multiplying by the number of counties (n) in the dataset yields the estimated 
slippage at the national level: 
 
RPn ββ .                                                     (Eq.13) 
____________________ 
 
42 This provision was reauthorized in section 301 of the 1981 Farm Bill and section 308 of the 
1985 Farm Bill.  The program was altered in 1993, which allowed farmers to collect only 85 
percent of deficiency payments on diverted land (see Hoffman, Schwartz & Chomo, 1995, 
pp.22-23). 
43 This coincides with the negative relationship between “diversion payments” and acres 
planted in corn found by Houck and Ryan (1972). 
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Table 6.   
Model II Results 
 First Stage Second Stage 
  P (instrumented) 
(z statistic) 
Centered R2 = .7180 
A 
(z statistic) 
Centered R2 = .5633 
CRP Enrollment 
(lagged) 
2.41x10-8 
(21.55***) 
 
Share of Exports 
 
6.03x10-8 
(27.80***) 
 
Foreign Exports -3.75x10-4 
(-24.63***) 
 
Per Capita Personal 
Income 
6.43x10-6 
(8.12***) 
 
Price of Oats 
 
0.2332 
(33.55***) 
 
Price of Rye 
 
4.47x10-2 
 (9.86***) 
 
Price of Corn 
 
0.3449 
(62.21***) 
 
Price of Barley 
 
0.4920 
(55.40***) 
 
Price of Wheat 
(lagged) 
 1,451.748 
(6.08***) 
Quantity Produced 
(lagged) 
 3.08x10-2 
(75.74***) 
Target Price  -6,754.920 
(-17.32***) 
Beale = 0 to 3  -5,793.271 
(-11.63***) 
Beale = 4  -7,899.628 
(-5.72***) 
Intercept 
 
1.7837 
(37.98***) 
37,678.400 
(16.69***) 
 
n = 2,413 
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The model therefore indicates a national slippage rate of 8.13 percent for 
wheat due to price feedback effects for any ∆R.   
 
Model II 
 The results for Model II are presented in Table 5.  Excluding the 
bottom ten percent of wheat-producing counties over the study period 
increased the slippage rate, albeit only slightly, to 8.44 percent.  The 
remainder of the coefficients are also consistent with Model I.  This indicates 
that the model’s findings are indeed robust. 
 
Model III 
 Model III, presented in Table 6, generated rather striking results.  The 
counties included in this model comprised the top ten percent wheat-
producing counties in the nation during the study period.  As such, these 
counties can be expected to have land and climates most suitable for wheat 
production relative to the remainder of the nation, and they can be expected 
to have the advantage of external economies of scale; both of these factors 
constitute an availability of resources for output expansion, which corresponds 
to a greater own-price elasticity of supply.  The coefficient for price of wheat is 
therefore considerably higher for the counties in this sample than in the 
previous models.   
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Table 7.   
Model III Results 
 First Stage Second Stage 
  P (instrumented) 
(z statistic) 
Centered R2 = .6944 
A 
(z statistic) 
Centered R2 = .3966 
CRP Enrollment 
(lagged) 
5.72x10-8 
(14.02***) 
 
Share of Exports 
 
6.05x10-8 
(11.93***) 
 
Foreign Exports -8.61x10-4 
(-16.71***) 
 
Per Capita Personal 
Income 
-1.74x10-5 
(-6.63***) 
 
Price of Oats 
 
0.1976 
(8.62***) 
 
Price of Rye 
 
-6.41x10-3 
(-0.41) 
 
Price of Corn 
 
0.3943 
(17.95***) 
 
Price of Barley 
 
0.5057 
(17.11***) 
 
Price of Wheat 
(lagged) 
 14,746.360 
(10.27***) 
Quantity Produced 
(lagged) 
 1.96x10-2 
(31.22***) 
Target Price  -42,072.730 
(-16.99***) 
Beale = 0 to 3  -16,296.780 
(-2.68***) 
Beale = 4  -36,538.930 
(-2.71***) 
Intercept 
 
3.5560 
(22.97***) 
263,050.000 
(19.52***) 
 
n = 268 
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The calculated slippage rate for this group of counties is 22.6 percent, 
which is quite substantial.  The precise level to which this slippage offsets the 
stated environmental goals of the program, of course, is dependent on the 
sensitivity of the land in these areas.  The effect is significant, however, 
particularly as these counties produce approximately 55 percent of the nation’s 
wheat and a majority of these counties are located within the top fifteen states 
in terms of acres enrolled in the CRP (see Appendix), with the exception of 
Iowa and Mississippi.44  In short, the greatest slippage rates are seen in the 
states that have the greatest CRP enrollment. 
 Interestingly, the coefficient for target price is significantly higher in 
Model III than in previous models as well.  This is consistent with the income-
enhancing aspects of the 0/92 program discussed earlier and the sensitivity of 
these counties to downturns in the commodity market due to the relative 
importance of commodity production to the local economy. 
 The goodness of fit of the second stage regression and the significance 
levels of most of the variables decrease in Model III; this decrease in statistical 
significance is particularly true for the Beale Code parameters and for the 
substitute commodity variables.  This is likely due to the increased 
____________________ 
 
44
 Also note that 165 of the 268 counties in this dataset are located in nine of the twelve states 
studied in Wu (2000; 2005) and Roberts and Bucholtz (2002; 2005).  
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homogeneity of the counties in the smaller sample in terms of urbanization 
and in commodity production. 
 
Conclusion 
 This analysis used cropping data from all contiguous United States 
counties that planted wheat in any of the six years prior to implementation of 
the Conservation Reserve Program and eight years after.  The price of wheat 
was instrumented with aggregate enrollment in the CRP treated as an 
endogenous variable in order to detect increases in acres planted, a 
phenomenon referred to as land loss slippage, resulting from price increases 
brought about by reduction in supply due to land retirement under the 
program.  The model finds a positive and significant correlation between 
aggregate CRP enrollment and the price of wheat at the state level.  Using this 
estimate of the increase in wheat price resulting from a given increase in CRP 
enrollment and the estimate of the effect of this price increase on acres planted 
in wheat, the rate of slippage was estimated to fall within the range of 8.13 and 
22.6 percent.   
 Offsetting increases in land use resulting from a program designed to 
reduce land use for environmental purposes carries potentially serious policy 
implications.  If the land being activated is highly erodible, then any 
environmental benefits of land retirement under the program will be 
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significantly compromised.  Any estimate of the degree of damage done to the 
program’s stated conservation goals would require numerous assumptions as to 
the type of land being activated – the degree to which the highest quality land, 
which as previously discussed will be the first used by profit-maximizing 
farmers, is already in use, thus indicating whether land being activated is high 
or low quality and the degree to which this is an indicator of erodibility.   
However, putting aside questions of magnitude, any activation of new 
land or of land previously left fallow carries environmental consequences, be it 
loss of soil productivity due to interruptions in crop rotation, wind erosion due 
to tillage, or clearing of land cover resulting in water erosion and potential loss 
of wildlife habitat.  As stated by Laycock (1988): “Plowing new land… 
following retirement of substantial amounts of erodible land would negate the 
effects of a very expensive conservation program” (p.7).  These results would 
therefore clearly be problematic to the putative environmental thrust behind 
the CRP.  However, if the primary intent of the program was to generate 
largesse through program rental payments, the results of the preceding model 
would not create a significant hindrance to achieving that goal.     
 
  
CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Summation 
 Unintended effects often accompany public policy.  In this study, the 
presence of price-feedback land-loss slippage (LLS) for wheat in the 
Conservation Reserve Program has been indicated.  Previous studies 
investigating the presence of other types of slippage have been carried out 
with varying results.  However, when such effects are investigated, the 
question of relevance should be raised.   
LLS in particular has potentially serious ramifications for a program 
aimed at diminishing soil erosion through the reduction of cultivated lands; as 
was stated in a USDA (2006) report: “[I]f payments are structured largely for 
income support (albeit with the condition that recipients must meet some 
environmental standards), a given level of conservation program funding is 
likely to produce less environmental gain” (p.28).  Activation of new land, 
particularly if that land is itself environmentally sensitive, can result in an 
offset of any environmental benefits generated by the program.  This being the 
case, the relevance of the slippage question is evident.  If policies are intended 
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to fulfill some purpose, effects that directly conflict with that purpose should 
be detected so that they can be dealt with or compensated for to the extent 
possible.  All of this assumes, however, that the policy is intended, primarily at 
least, to carry out the purpose stated.   
 The question of relevance takes on a different tenor when joined with 
the question of “purpose in fact” (Posner, 1971).  If the intendment of the 
policy is not conservation but rather distribution of income to landowners, 
particularly utilizing rental payments for program enrollment, slippage 
becomes a far less relevant issue for this study as well as for all previous 
treatments of the question.  Therefore, in this case study, the presence of an 
unintended effect provides an arrow that points to the question of purpose in 
fact.   
 This research endeavor argued that the purpose in fact of the CRP 
when it was formulated and adopted in 1985 was primarily to provide income 
support to financially strapped farmers.  This position was supported using a 
three-pronged argument.  First, an historical perspective on the relationship 
between conservation policy and farm policies explicitly aimed at supporting 
farm income was provided.  The 1956 Soil Bank Act, which authorized a 
program virtually identical to the 1985 CRP and was framed as intended to aid 
farmers by reducing surpluses created by wartime stimulative agricultural 
programs, was pointed out as particularly noteworthy.   
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 Next, the CRP was scrutinized in terms of policy typology.  The 
argument was proffered that the CRP, like farm commodity programs before 
it, is better described as distributive (Lowi, 1964) or clientele (Wilson, 1973) 
than as regulatory, due to the concentration of benefits with farmers and 
diffuseness of any benefit accrued to the environment.     
 Lastly, the agricultural lobby’s response to a change in its policy 
environment was examined.  Farm interests held nearly absolute sway in the 
agricultural policy arena for much of the twentieth century, but the rise of the 
environmental lobby as a national political force with the backing of 
increasing public awareness and sentiment created a threat to the dominance 
of the farm lobby.  Additionally, agriculture was being faced with the political 
climate created by the Reagan Administration that favored decreased federal 
involvement in the marketplace, including the agricultural market.  The farm 
lobby acted preemptively by advocating a program with a conservationist 
policy image but that accomplished their own purposes.  This not only 
provided farmers with income support in an adverse market, but it gave the 
environmental lobby a large symbolic victory and allowed lawmakers to claim 
a proactive stance on conservation, in effect serving as an attempt to inoculate 
the agriculture policy subsystem against incursion by potentially harmful 
pressure from conservationists.  In the case of the CRP, soil erosion reductions 
have been realized, although the extent to which they may have been offset by 
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slippage (of all types) remains an open question.  This study found LLS from 
price feedback effects that ranged from moderate but statistically significant in 
the broader models to quite large and significant in the narrower model of the 
top wheat-producing counties.  Although the precise amount by which this 
price-feedback LLS offset soil conservation benefits was not examined in this 
research, previous research (Wu, 2000) adduced reductions in soil 
conservation benefits between 9 to 14 percent due to LLS resulting from 
substitution effects.   
 Taking all of the foregoing factors into account creates a strong case for 
the position that the CRP was formulated and adopted in 1985 primarily for 
the purpose of supporting farmer incomes with conservation goals being of 
secondary concern.  With this in view, slippage becomes likewise of secondary 
import.  LLS has potential deleterious effects on erosion reduction and the 
protection of natural habitats, as well as upon surplus reduction goals.  
However, LLS poses no threat to the stream of rental payments to program 
land.   
 As demonstrated by Shoemaker (1989a), Johnson, Wolcott and 
Aradhyula (1990), Shaik, Helmers and Atwood (2005) and Lambert, Sullivan, 
Claassen and Foreman (2006), farmers garner significant benefits from the 
payment stream both from immediate income supplementation and from 
increases in land value.  The activation of new cropland would allow the 
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agricultural industry to enjoy the benefits of both sustaining the income levels 
of struggling farmers – even allowing the removal of some small farm 
operations from production entirely, as found by Lambert et al (2006), which 
itself yields benefits to remaining producers through a reduction in 
competition – and potentially of garnering economic rents from selling the 
additional commodities produced on the newly activated land at inflated 
prices.    
 
Addenda 
 This research follows the timeframe of Wu (2000; 2005) and Roberts 
and Bucholtz (2002; 2005) and focuses on the CRP as it was initially 
authorized in the 1985 Farm Bill.  However, the CRP was subsequently 
reauthorized in 1990, 1996 and 2002 with incremental changes.  These 
changes may serve either to sustain or refute the theory laid out in this work. 
 A theory is presented in this study to explain the interaction between 
farm and conservation interests during the formulation and adoption of the 
CRP.  According to this theory, a subsystem that is threatened with incursion 
can act preemptively and disarm the threat by co-opting the language of its 
opponent in order to frame a policy favorable to its own interest as already 
friendly to that represented by the incurring group.  Doing so not only 
deprives the new opponent of a target for its attacks on the status quo of the 
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subsystem, but it allows the enactment of a policy that incurs benefits on the 
existing powers that be in the subsystem.   
 The sustainability of this theory can be tested by examining the 
behavior of the farm and conservation interests at the time of the subsequent 
reauthorizations of the CRP and by evaluating who enjoys the greatest benefit 
from the incremental changes that occurred with these reauthorizations.   
 In the 1990 reauthorization (104-Stat-3359), wetland and wildlife 
habitat restoration was added to the list of objectives for the program.  This 
provision potentially expanded the positive environmental impacts of the 
program, but also expanded the types of land that could be enrolled, 
potentially benefiting landowners.  In the 2002 reauthorization (116-Stat-134), 
enrollment was limited to land that had been cropped in three of the previous 
six years.  While clearly a provision intended to prevent abuse of the program, 
this did constitute a restriction on landowner behavior.  Additionally, USDA 
proposals for the 2007 reauthorization (USDA, 2007) call for the use of 
program land for the growth of perennial vegetation that can be harvested, 
with the proviso that harvesting not interfere with wildlife nesting seasons, for 
use as biomass fuel.  This would also have impacts both on landowners and on 
soil conservation. 
 If these changes can be demonstrated to primarily benefit farmers as 
did the CRP as originally authorized, then this would indicate that the farm 
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lobby has been successful at using preemptive policymaking to preserve their 
position of dominance.  If the opposite proves to be the case, it would be 
evidence that conservationists have been successful at gaining ground within 
the agricultural policy arena.  The outcome that is predicted is that the farm 
lobby has continued to advocate favorable changes to the program with some 
increasing success on the part of conservation interests to expand the 
environmental benefits of the program as these interests gain an increased 
foothold within the subsystem.  As was the case in 1985, other forces can be 
expected to be seen at work as well.  Spending on programs was a major issue 
when the 1985 Farm Bill was being formulated; pressure to control 
expenditures on the CRP can be expected to continue to be a force influencing 
later reauthorizations.  One might expect the 2002 provision limiting 
enrollment to be a response to such pressure.   
 In conclusion, if study of the subsequent reauthorizations indicates 
growing discord between conservation and farming interests accompanied by 
waning benefits to farmers, it would tend to refute the preemptive 
policymaking theory laid out above.  However, if farm interests continue to 
maintain their dominance in garnering increased benefits for their members 
and there continues to be friendliness toward conservation issues on the part 
of farmers with little conflict observed with conservation interests, the theory 
is sustained. 
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Table A-1. 
State CRP Enrollment (Total), Ranked by Number of Contracts 
March 1986 – June 1992 
 
Rank State Contracts 
   
1 Iowa 35,667 
2 Kansas 31,020 
3 Minnesota 27,224 
4 Missouri 22,804 
5 Wisconsin 20,789 
6 Texas 19,762 
7 Illinois 19,685 
8 North Dakota 18,520 
9 Georgia 14,718 
10 Nebraska 14,449 
11 Mississippi 13,567 
12 South Dakota 12,476 
13 Indiana 11,539 
14 Tennessee 10,830 
15 Alabama 10,113 
16 Oklahoma 8,688 
17 Ohio 8,542 
18 Kentucky 8,102 
19 Michigan 8,039 
20 Montana 7,925 
21 South Carolina 6,737 
22 North Carolina 6,497 
23 Colorado 6,207 
24 Washington 4,483  
 Rank State Contracts 
   
25 Idaho 3,907 
26 Arkansas 3,418 
27 Virginia 3,186 
28 Pennsylvania 2,649 
29 Florida 2,497 
30 Oregon 2,012 
31 Louisiana 1,785 
32 New York 1,729 
33 New Mexico 1,518 
34 Utah 997 
35 Maine 941 
36 Wyoming 795 
37 Maryland 707 
38 California 511 
39 West Virginia 35 
40 Delaware 30 
41 New Jersey 30 
42 Nevada 10 
43 Vermont 10 
44 Massachusetts 5 
45 Connecticut 1 
46 Arizona 0 
47 New Hampshire 0 
48 Rhode Island 0  
 
Source: ERS Statistical Bulletin 925 
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Figure A-1.  Number of Contracts 
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Table A-2. 
State CRP Enrollment (Total), Ranked by Number of Acres 
March 1986 – June 1992 
 
Rank State Acres 
   
1 Texas 4,150,485 
2 North Dakota 3,180,569 
3 Kansas 2,937,863 
4 Montana 2,854,307 
5 Iowa 2,224,834 
6 South Dakota 2,120,255 
7 Colorado 1,978,390 
8 Minnesota 1,928,954 
9 Missouri 1,726,835 
10 Nebraska 1,425,423 
11 Oklahoma 1,192,504 
12 Washington 1,047,029 
13 Idaho 877,059 
14 Mississippi 841,826 
15 Illinois 811,926 
16 Wisconsin 746,530 
17 Georgia 706,459 
18 Alabama 573,190 
19 Oregon 530,766 
20 New Mexico 483,181 
21 Tennessee 475,625 
22 Indiana 462,649 
23 Kentucky 451,317 
24 Ohio 377,089  
 Rank State Acres 
   
25 Michigan 332,853 
26 South Carolina 278,071 
27 Arkansas 260,006 
28 Wyoming 257,224 
29 Utah 233,978 
30 California 187,499 
31 North Carolina 151,008 
32 Louisiana 146,571 
33 Florida 134,860 
34 Pennsylvania 101,078 
35 Virginia 79,556 
36 New York 64,498 
37 Maine 38,490 
38 Maryland 20,392 
39 Nevada 3,123 
40 Delaware 995 
41 New Jersey 723 
42 West Virginia 618 
43 Vermont 193 
44 Massachusetts 32 
45 Connecticut 10 
46 Arizona 0 
47 New Hampshire 0 
48 Rhode Island 0  
 
Source: ERS Statistical Bulletin 925 
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Figure A-2.  Total Number of Acres Enrolled 
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